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By Jeffrey S. Lubbers*

ence after the bitter 2004 election,
nhePresident
Bush's first
conferremarked:"With
thepress
campaign
over,Americans are expecting a bipartisan effort and results." l He also
commented that," [O]ne of the disappointments of being here in Washington
is how bitter this town can become and
how divisive. I'm not blaming one party
or the other. It's just the reality ofWashington, D.C ... It also makes it difficult
2
to govern at times."
The President actually took a first step
to promoting bipartisanship and reducmg bitterness in Washington a fexx days
before the election on October 30, 2004,
by signing into law Public Law 108-401,
the Federal Regulatory Improvement
Act of 2004, a bill to reauthorize the
Administrative Conference of the U.S.
(ACUS).3

As regular readers of the V's knoxx,
ACUS was closed in October 1995 after
* Section Fellow, and Fellow in La-w and
Government,Washington College of Law,
American Universit, former Research Director of the Administrative Conference from
1982-1995.

'Transcript, George.W Bush, Presidential
Press Conference, Nov 4_ 2004, available at
htrp://-wxx.-xhitehouse.gov/news/releases/
2004/11/20041104-5.html.
'Id.

3

The bill, H.R. 4917, was passed by the
House of Representatives by unanimous
consent on October 8, 20(4, and then three
days later, the House bill was passed by the
Senate, also by unanimous consent. It was
signed into law by President, on October 30.
Pub. L. No. 108-401, 118 Stat. 2255.
4 See H. Rep. No. 103-127 (1993) (Treasury,
Postal Service, and General Government
Appropriations Bill, 1994) at p. 76. For the
definitive account of this period, see Toni
Fine, A Legislative Analysis of the Demise ofthre
Administrative Conference of the United States, 30
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 19 (1998).
5Jeffrey S. Lubbers, "IfIt Didn't Exist, It Would
Have To Be Invented"-Retiving Tie Administrati'c

Conference, 30 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 147, 161 (1998).
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almost 30 years of making recommendations to the government on improving
the fairness and efficiency of administrative procedures because congressional
appropriators, determined that ACUS
had "fully accomplished its mission," and
4
so appropriated no funds.
In my own post mortem to ACUS
written in 1998, 1 optimistically
concluded that," [I]t is only a matter of
time before Congress and the President
recognize this country's need for objective, non-partisan expertise on the
crucial, but not always politically 4sexy,'
issues of administrative procedure implementation and reform.5 I am pleased to
6

Justice Scalia was Chairman of ACUS from
1972-74, and Justice Breyer was a liaison
representative of the Judicial Conference from
1981-95. For a description ofJustice (thenJudge) Breyer's activities as a member of

ACUS, see Jeffrey S. Lubbers,Jstice Steplen
Breyer: Purveyorof Common Sense in lany

Forums, 8 ADMIN. L.J.AM. U. 775 (1995).
7 See Statement ofAntonin Scalia, before the
House Subconinittee on Commercial and
Administrative La-, Committee on the
Judiciary, Hearing on the Reauthorization
of the Administrative Conference of the
United States (May 20, 2004), available at
http:// w\wwN house.gov/judiciary/scaba032004.
htm. and Statement of Stephen Breyer, id.,
available at http://wxx-".house.gov/judiciarv/
bre er( 52( )04.htm.
8 The two letters are reprinted as an appendix
to Lubbers, supra note 5, at 162-67.
9 Mr. Gray was a member of the Presidentially
appointed Council ofACUS from 1993-95,
and Ms. Payton was a public member from
1980-88.
is Mr. Harter was Senior StaffAttorney at the
Conference in the late 1970s and subse-

quently a consultant on several major research
projects. Mr. Edles xxas the Conference's
General Counsel from 1987-95.
r Testimony of C. Boyden Gray before the

House Subconimuittee on Commercial and
Administrative Laxx, Committee on theJudiciary,
Hearing on the Reauthorization ofthe Administrative Conference of the United States (June 24,
2004), availableat http://!xxvx.house.gov/
judiciary/gray062404.htm

say that time has now come thanks to the
efforts of Representative Chris Cannon
(R. UT), Chairman of the House Judiciary Cominittee's Subcommittee on
Commercial and Administrative Law,
who this summer held two hearings on
"Reauthorization of the Administrative
Conference of the United States," and
then in July introduced (along with 33
co-sponsors) H.R. 4917.
The two hearings conducted by the
House Subcommittee amply demonstrated broad support forACUS's revival.
The first hearing provided the perhaps
unprecedented spectacle of two Justices
of the Supreme Court discussing the
operations of an executive branch agency
before a comimttee of Congress. Both
Antonin Scalia and Stephen Breyer, each
of wx
hom had served inACUS earlier in
their careers, 6 were unstinting intheir
support for reviving it.7 Both Justices had
in fact written Senate Judiciary Comnittee in a vain attempt to preserve ACUS
in 1995,8 and their continuing commitment to ACUS speaks volumes.
The second hearing -,vas also a bipartisan event with formerACUS members
C. Boyden Gray and Sallyanne Payton 9

and former staff lawyers Philip Harter
and Gary EdlesO providing strong
support for the revival ofACUS.
Mr. Gray, former White House
Counsel in the Bush I Administration.
spoke on behalf of this Section of the
ABA and the ABA itself. He stressed the
bipartisan support for the Conference
and concluded that: "Through the years,
the Conference -was a valuable resource
providing information on the efficienc.
adequacy and fairness of the administrative procedures used by administrative
agencies in carrying out their programs.
This vas a continuing responsibility and
a continuing need, a need that has not
ceased to exist."II
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prioritization and information and scientific consensus in regulation. 16 Phil
Harter provided numerous other ideas

about ACUS's future operational and
research functions.
ACUS's mix of research and operational/coordinative functions is what
made it valuable in the past and it is what
ACUS needs to do in the future. After all,
procedural improvements can produce
large savings to the government. 17 But
there are also the intangible, but real,
benefits of simply promoting consensus
and dialogue-two resources in short
supply inWashington these days.The
Conference was a true public-private
partnership, where partisan politics were
checked at the door. Experts from opposite ends of theWashington political
spectrum, such as James Miller of Citizens
for a Sound Economy and Alan Morrison of the Public Citizen Litigation
Group, could and did have cordial and
productive discussions of administrative
reform. Government officials and private
experts could reach understandings that
often eluded otherwise adversary relationships.This can happen again once
ACUS reopens its doors.

But the resurrection is not yet
complete.The authorized funds must still
be appropriated. Public Law 108-401
authorizes the appropriations of not more
than $3 million, for fiscal year 2005, $3.1
million for fiscal year 2006, and $3.2
million for fiscal year 200718 -providing a
lean but reasonable budget, since the
Conference's highest budget was just over
$2 million in the early 1990s.
The ABA strongly urged the Senate
Appropriations Committee to provide
the authorized $3 million for FY 2005
during the brief post-election session.19
Unfortunately this did not happen, so the
effort must be renewed in the next
Congress. But once the Congress does
provide the appropriations, and if President Bush appoints a respected and
non-partisan Chair who can command
respect among all sectors of the legal
community, in and outside ofWashington, a renewed era of consensus and
bipartisanship, at least in the sometimes
obscure but crucial world of administrative law, will begin. 0

12Pub. L. No 88-499, as amended, codified at
5 U.S.C. 5 591-96.
13The new law only adds four new paragraphs
(2-5) to the "Purposes" section of the Administrative Conference Act, 5 U.S.C. 5 591.
14 See 5 U.S.C. § 594. Its central statutory
mission is to: "study the efficiency, adequacy,
and fairness of the administrative procedure
used by administrative agencies in carrying
out administrative programs."
15Gray testimony, supra note 11.
16 For more information on these initiatives,
see the website of the Office of Information
and Regulatory Affairs in OMB. For prompt
letters see, http://www.whitehouse.gov/
omb/inforeg/prompt letter.htmil;
for data quality and peer review issues, see
http:/ vwxNx,.whitehouse.gov/ omb /inforeg/
infopoltech.htrnl.

17Some such savings can be quantified. For
example, a simple change devised by the
Conference in 1980 to end the once notorious
"race-to-the courthouse" procedure has probably saved over a million dollars since. See ACUS
Recommendation 80-5,"Eliminating or Simplifying the 'Race-to-the Courthouse' in Appeals
from Agency Action," 45 Fed. Reg. 84,954
(Dec. 24, 1980).The recormnendation was
implemented in 1988 by Pub. L. No. 100-236,
Selection of Court for Multiple Appeals, 101
Star. 1731. It was estimated that each such race
produced $100,000 in unnecessary litigation
costs.Alternative dispute resolution processes
recommended and furthered by the Conference
in the last 15 years of its existence also saved
millions. See Administrative Conference of the
U.S., Toward ImprovedAgency Dispute Resolution:
Implementing theADRAct (Feb. 1995) (docu-

menting savings). Streamlined civil penalty
procedures resulting from an ACUS recommendation made in 1972 under then-Chairman
Scalia have produced tens ofmillions of additional dollars for the US.Treasury since then.
See ACUS Recommendation 72-6,"Civil
Money Penalties as a Sanction," available at
http: //www.law.fsu.edu/library/admin/acus/
305726.htiml. Later statistics, published in Cohn
Diver,The Assessment and Mitigation of Civil
Money Penalties, 79 COLUM. L. REV 1435
(1979), showed a dramatic increase in receipts to
the US.Treasury.
18Pub. L. No. 108-401 § 3.
19 See letter from Robert D. Evans, Director
ABA Governmental Affairs Office to Hon.
Ted Stevens, Chairman, and Hon. Robert
Byrd, Ranking Member, Cormnittee on
Appropriations, U.S. Senate, (Nov. 12, 2004).

As a drafting matter, the legislative

revival was relatively simple. One of the
interesting things about the Congressional action to defund ACUS in 1995
was that ACUS's authorizing statute, the
12
Administrative Conference Act, was
not repealed and remains in the U.S.
Code.The reauthorizing legislation
recognized this, and was designed to refund ACUS with only minimal changes
to the Administrative Conference Act. 13
This mandate, along with the broad
powers and duties already assigned to the
Conference, 14provides ample authority
for tackling the important problems of
the day. For example, Boyden Gray
pointed to the need for "some empirical
research on the innovation of the OMB
'prompt' letter, matters relating to data
quality and peer review issues."' 15 These
are all recent initiatives of Congress and

OMB relating to the need for better
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A Remarkable Chairman
By Ernie Gellhorn*

ment of Deborah Majoras to
he
President's
recess
appointsucceed
Timothy
J. Muris
as
chairman of the Federal Trade Commission signals an appropriate time to
appraise the Muris Comiission and to
consider why it has been so successful.
Under Muris, the FTC became one of
Washington's more interesting agencies,
praised by Congress and the professional
bar as well as both liberals and conservatives.This is a dramatic change from the
late 1970's when the Commission was
derisively labeled a meddlesome
"national nanny" because of the FTC's
clumsy effort to regulate advertising on
children's television programs.
Muris'leadership vas distinctive. He
emphasized the need for newx initiatives
based on rigorous empirical studies and
analysis showing that regulatory benefits
outweighed their costs. He insisted that
the enforcement agenda be limited to
truly significant matters wx
here FTC
intervention could make a difference in
removing restraints on competition or
protecting consumer wxelfare.The Muris
FTC directed significant resources to
challenging mergers and anticompetitive
restraints in the health care and pharmaceutical industries -,,here competition
often was not open. Industry-xvide practices that inhibited competition were its
primary targets. Its public advocacy,
particularly its amicus briefs addressing
important FDA and patent policy questions raised in private litigation,
expanded the FTC's influence. Perhaps
most obvious to consumers vas the
Muris Commission's success in creating a
"Do Not Call" registry that has sharply
reduced unwanted phone solicitations
for over 60 million households.
The Commission used its complementary consumer protection and
antitrust powers to challenge conduct
*Past Section Chair and Delegate; Section
Felloxv; Co-Reporter forJudicial Reviess.APA
Project; and Professor, George Mason Univer-

that misused market power or injured
vulnerable consumers. Its emphasis on
fraud directed at Spanish-speaking
consumers extended consumer protection enforcement to a neglected
community.The FTC's enforcement
efforts also recognized the limits of the
Commission's power. For example,
despite the success of its crackdown on
unsolicited telephone calls, Muris
opposed legislative proposals by Senator
Charles Schumer to create a similar "Do
Not Spam" registry because the
Commission practicably could not
enforce action against the primary malefactors, disreputable fly-by-night and
foreign operators.
Muris' leadership succeeded because
he was knowledgeable and experienced
and had skills that permitted him to
survive in Washington's turbulent waters.
Muris xxwas xxell served by his academic
and political experience.
Like his highly regarded Democratic
predecessor, Robert Pitofsky, Muris vas
already recognized as an authority on
antitrust and consumer protection
wvhen he took office, having honed his
ideas as a scholar and having grounded
them in experience as a former director
of both the FTC's competition and
consumer protection bureaus. He was
prepared to act from his first day as
chairman with a clear agenda and ideas
for implementing it.
A savyx politician and bureaucrat in
the best sense of those terms, Muris built
public, congressional andWhite House
support for his programs. He explained
them through innumerable speeches,
mterviexws and reports. Building on the
Pitofsky Commission's revival of public
workshops, the Muris FTC held workshops on consumer protection issues
from spam to spyware and on competition issues from basic patent policies to
marketing practices in the health care

industr: Its generic drug patent report
resulted in major legislation.
Unlike many agency chairmen, Muris
wx
illingly expended his political capital
to challenge unsound policy proposals
or investigations. For example, he
harshly rejected as "fundamentally
flawx ed" a GAO study popular in
Congress that faulted the FTC's oversight of oil company mergers because
that report ignored obvious other causes
of price increases such as OPEC generated price hikes, domestic and foreign
supply disruptions, and a surging
world economy.
Knowing that he could not do it alone,
Muris also took care to develop a close
rapport x-ith fellow commissioners by
listening to their viewx s and by investing
them as partners in implementing specific
programs. He recruited a creative and
qualified staff from the practicing bar,
academe and think tanks.Thus, despite a
distinctive antitrust and consumer protection agenda, he -,vas never in a minority
during his 38 months as chairman, an
unusual achievement inWashington's
partisan atmosphere.
This does not mean that Muris (or the
FTC) wx
as alxways successful or right. His
sensible agreement with the Antitrust
Division allocating merger reviewx assignments died in conmittee.And the FTC's
approval of the RJR-Brown &
Williamson merger creating a duopoly in
the cigarette industry. even though prices
more than doubled in recent years in the
face of dramatically declining demand
and far more limited cost increases, seems
contrary to sound economics and
consumer welfare.
The FTCs new chairman faces the
continuing challenge of refreshing and
refining antitrust and consumer protection policies. For example, the line
between desirable laxvfil aggressive
competition and impermissible refusals to
continued on page 10

sin- School of Laxx.
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Some Reflections on OPM's Administration
of Its APA ALJ Functions
ByJohn T MillerJr.*

I

oversight of the recruitment of
have been involved in the bar's
candidates for appointment as
federal Administrative Law Judges for
over forty years.This article reflects on
the recruitment process - past, present
and future.
In the 1950s the United States Civil
Service Commission's performance of its
duties as to the appointment of what
were then called "Hearing Examiners"
under Section 11 of the Administrative
Procedure Act was so deficient that the
American BarAssociation concluded
that the function should be taken away
from the agency. In the early 1960s,
under the leadership of Chairman John
Macy, the Commission proposed several
reforms which would enforce more
rigorous qualification and examination
standards intended to result in the certification of the highest caliber lawyers. I
was then Chair of the Hearing Examiners Committee of the Administrative
Law Section. In that capacity I had the
privilege of attending a meeting between
the President of the ABA and Mr. Macy
in which the Association agreed to
support the new program in light of its
proposed reforms. I was particularly
impressed by the fact that there was to be
an upgrade in the qualifications that
applicants must meet; every candidate
was to be examined by a panel of three
of which one would be a member of the
private bar; and the office established to
administer the new program would be
under the Commission's Executive
Director who would be in a position to
notify the Commission's Chairman
immediately as to anything that went
*Past Section Chair and current Chair ofAdHoc Committee on Review of Recruitment
ofALJs by OPM.This presentation was made
as a member of the panel on "Administration
and Independence: OPM,ALJs, and the APA,"
at the 2004 Administrative Law Conference,
Washington, DC on October 21,2004.
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wrong.We soon found that deficiencies
remained. But most were remedied
when brought to the Commission's
attention; albeit after some delay.
The ABA had helped spread news of
the new recruitment program nationwide. Almost immediately we sensed that
something was wrong.The requirement
that each applicant have two years of
administrative law experience excluded
most of the bar in the United States from
any consideration.The Commission
helped us identify the problem by
communicating with interested lawyers
who failed to follow-up on their initial
inquiries.The solution was a decision to
accept two years of trial experience as a
qualification allowing a candidate's application to be processed.This broadened
the pool of talented lawyers able to attain
the register of eligibles from which
Hearing Examiners were appointed.

It took us afeu, years to
realize that getting on the
registerproved to be a
barren accomplishmentfor
most applicants.
It took us a few years to realize that
getting on the register proved to be a
barren accomplishment for most applicants.To that extent, the efforts of the bar
to improve the quality of appointments
fell short of our expectations.When
lawyers high on the register realized that
they were being passed over by agencies
appointing Hearing Examiners, they
complained to the ABA. My investigations revealed that many of the most
capable candidates on the general register
simply had little or no hope of appointment as Hearing Examiners.We had
failed to appreciate the pernicious effect

of arrangements made by the Civil
Service Comnission with several agencies which provided for the creation of
separate registers which listed only those
lawyers with two years of specialized
experience; a practice called "selective
certification."This enabled agencies to
appoint most Hearing Examiners from
their own staffi.While we recognized
that specialized experience might
provide a candidate a temporary advantage in terms of getting the agency's cases
heard, we concluded that it did not
warrant passing over more able lawyers
capable of acquiring the specialized
knowledge and serving more ably in a
life-time judicial position. It took us
several years to persuade the Commission to abandon selection certification
which, we believed, fostered cronyism
and debased the merit system.
As we learned more about how the
new system was working from members
of the bar serving on the interview
panels, we began to consider other ways
of improving the system.As a consequence, the Administrative Law Section
urged the Civil Service Commission to
change the tide of the post from
"Hearing Examiner" to "Judge."We
hoped, thereby, to accomplish two objectives. First, higher caliber lawyers would
seek appointment. Second, incumbents
would be encouraged to perform their
duties in the best traditions of the judiciary.The change of title
was made
effective by the Commission in 1972.
There was one change we were not
able to effect; that was the elimination of
veterans preference, a modification of the
scoring system which many veterans, like
myself,thought inappropriate in the
evaluation ofjudicial candidates.
The structure of the Administrative
Law Section performing the ABA's
oversight functions in the 1960s has
since changed. I can't remember when
the Hearing Examiners Committee was
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abolished. It was succeeded in recent
years by the four-member Ad Hoc
Committee which I currently chair.This
Committee now consists of three
former Chairs of the Section and a
prominent xvoman lawyer, all of xwhom
have had considerable administrative
trial experience.
In the 1980's and early 1990's, the ABA
demonstrated its continued interest in
the quality of administrative judicial
proceedings by supporting legislation
xxwhich would have established an ALJ
Corps. I testified several times before
Congressional committees in support of
the proposal. I believed it worthxwhile for
three basic reasons. It xvould create an
organization xvhich could better-assure
newly-appointed ALJs that they could
look forward to a life-time career not
dependent on the continued existence of
a particular executive agency or a narrow
legislative program. It assured provision
of continuing legal education that would
help judges perform their duties more
efficiently and xvould facilitate their
mobility to areas of the law xvhere their
services xvere required.The proposed
legislation would also establish a fair
disciplinary system for the ALJs.What is
notexworthy in terms of my remarks
today is the fact that this legislation
assumed, indeed depended on, the
continued performance by OPM of its
historic statutory duties in the recruitment and examination ofALJ candidates
under the APA.
In 2004, some forty years after I first
became involved, the bar is once more
called upon to examine how the United
States Office of Personnel Management,
the successor of the Civil Service
Commission, is carrying out its APA
functions as to ALJs.That study is not
complete.Therefore, I cannot share xvith
you any conclusions of the Ad Hoc
Committee. However, I can note some
developments xvhich warrant our
close attention.
In the Spring of 2003, OPM abolished the Office ofAdministrative Law
Judges which Mr. Macy had set up in
the 1960s as part of the agency's
commitment which elicited the support
of the ABA. I might observe that
although that office lost its high status in
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the Commission over the years, it
continued to be the principle vehicle
through xxwhich we expressed our
concerns as to the ALJ program.
We are nox in the process of determining how OPM's successor
organizational structure is carrying out
the agency's statutory obligations.To
that end, I requested of OPM in August
that it detail the offices and officials to
which its ALJ statutory functions have
been assigned.We await a response
xvhich, I hope, can be a basis for followup discussions.
In February, 2003 1learned for the first
time, from the decision of the United
States Court ofAppeals for the Federal
Circuit in the Azdell case, then identified
as Meeker .James,319 E3d 1368 (Fed.
Cir. 2003), that OPM materially changed
its method ofscoringALJ candidates in
1996.According to the Court, xx'hen
OPM learned in that year that approximately 80 percent of the applicants had
failed to attain the minimum score of 70
then required under the agency's 1993
formula to qualify for the register of
eligibles, OPM decided to modif\- the
scoring formula.The Court ofAppeals
described the nex procedure in these
terms: "applicants xx'ho satisfied a
minimum requirement of seven years'
experience as an attorney involved in
administrative hearings or litigation and
completed the remaining parts of the
examination xvere assigned a base score
of 70 points."The Court noted that additional points xxwere then added for the
four graded portions of the examination,
namely, (1) the supplemental qualification statement, (2) the xwritten
demonstration, (3) the personal interviex, and (4) the personal reference
inquir.The Court concluded:"the 1996
formula guaranteed that any applicant
xvho met the xvork experience prerequisite and completed the four graded
portions of the examination would
receive a passing score and be placed on
the register, regardless of the applicant's
score on the four graded portions."This
appears to me to mean that even if OPM
xxas advised through the graded portion
of the exam that an applicant x\%as an
impatient bully, or xxas a poor legal
draftsman, or lacked judicial demeanor,

the applicant was certified as eligible for
appointment as an ALJ so long as the
candidate had the requisite seven years of
experience and had done all the paper
work. It seems to me that this development raises serious questions.
The authors of the 1992 study of the
Federal Adiinistrative Judiciarx. for the
Administrative Conference of the
United States observed: "In the view of
the Attorney General's Committee and
the Congress that enacted the APA, it
was desirable to ensure that hearing
examiners possessed superior qualificaare of any
tions." (pp 33-34). 1 am not awx
subsequent legislation that warrants a
different conclusion today.
I spent several years with other lawyers
and judges in the American Inns of
Court movement to help remedy a
widespread perception that there is a
great deal of incivilit in the practice of
law today. One does not need to practice
law for fifttx years to conclude that there
are in the legal community lawyers xwith
seven years of administrative or trial law
experience, who are adept at filling out
application forms, but who ought never
be appointed judges.
The months ahead will provide several
oversight challenges. Is it possible to
form some judgment at this point in
time as to the effect of the employiment
of the 1996 formula on the quality of
the law',yers subsequently appointed as
ALJs? I await a response to a request for
data from OPM xw hich might help initiate such an analysis.
Further ahead is another area of
inquir. OPM has been working on new
recruitment standards and a nex examination process xwich might be noticed
next year and on the basis of which a
new register of eligibles xvvll be prepared
wxhich xx.i1 replace the current register.
Some questions have come to my mind:
Isthe new program designed and
intended to produce the highest quality
candidates for appointment as Administrative Laxv Judges? Or xxill it be shaped
in a material wax by a desire to have a
program that xvill survive judicial review
by reducing the number of applicants
who xvill be disappointed in their efforts
to attain the register from which
appointments are made C.)
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Mercury and the Bush Administration
by Lisa Heinzerling and Rena Steinzor*

study and bureaucratic handn December
years of
wringing,
the2003,
EPA after
issuedten
a final
rule for mercury from chlor-alkali facilities, and it began the lengthy process of
writing a rule to control mercury emissions from power plants. For chlor-alkali
facilities that use mercury as an input to
production, the EPA decided to forego
any binding numerical limits on emissions, even though such plants "lose" as
much as 65 tons of mercury annually many tons more than the mercury
released by all of the power plants in the
country. For power plants, the EPA is
pushing a system that would allow electric utilities to trade rights to emit this
toxic substance, rather than requiring
each plant to install equipment that
would actually reduce its emissions.
EPA's preferred approach would delay
until 2026 any significant reductions of
mercury due to the mercury rule. In
sum, in a gift to the two industrial
sectors that together produce the lion's
share of mercury now poisoning fish
across the country, the EPA simply
refised to impose meaningful controls.
EPA's decisions are all the more
remarkable when one considers how

very clearly the basic building blocks
of modern environmental policylaw, science, and economics - pointed
in favor of swift and stringent controls
on mercury emissions.We begin with
the law.
In addressing mercury emissions from

power plants and chlor-alkali plants, EPA
faced a legally straightforward task.
Section 112 of the Clean Air Act lists
mercury as a hazardous air pollutant
subject to regulation, and EPA had previously concluded that both power plants
and chlor-alkali plants should be regulated as sources of mercury emissions.
Under the clear language of section 112,
listing of mercury and of these categories
of sources led to an obligation on the
part of EPA to regulate mercury emissions by prescribing the "maximum
achievable control technology" (MACT)
and requiring its installation.A MACT
directive would have required each individual source to reduce its emissions to
the level achieved by the best performers
in its source category. By many accounts,
this would have meant reducing mercury
emissions by as much as 90 percent,
within the three-year deadline provided
by section 112.
But in the ninth inning, after years of
cogitating on the appropriate MACT,
things went terribly wrong.With respect
to power plants, sometime in the months
before the agency was set to issue its
proposal to regulate mercuryJeffrey
Holmstead, the head of EPA's air office,
got the idea that it would be better to
reduce mercury by allowing industrywide emissions trading instead of
plant-specific pollution controls. This
about-face was such a drastic departure

* Lisa Heinzerling is a professor at the Georgetown Law Center. She is the author, with
economist Frank Ackerman, of Priceless:On
Knowing the Priceof Everything and the Value of
Nothing (The New Press, Feb. 2004). She thanks
TrevorWiessmann for excellent research assistance. Rena Stemzor is a professor at the
University of Maryland School of Law. She is
working on a longer analysis of the policies that
underlie failures to control toxics, including
mercury, that harm children. She thanks
Raymond Schlee for excellent research support.
Heinzerling and Steinzor are both member
scholars of the Center for Progressive Regulation, http://www.progressiveregulation.org.
This article draws upon two articles Heinzerling
and Steinzor have written on the mercury rules:
Lisa Heinzerling & Rena Steinzor, A Perfect
Stormn: Mercury and the Bush Administration, Part I,
34 Envtl. L. Rep. 10297 (April 2004), and Lisa
Heinzerling & Rena Steinzor, A Perfect Storm:
Mercury and the Bush Administration, Part 11,34
Env. L. Rep. 10485 (une 2004).

since 1990 that EPA officials did not have
the courage to take it to its logical
extreme and announce trading as the
only approach EPA would pursue.
Instead, the agency's Federal Register
notice soliciting comments on Holmstead's ideas preserved the possibility that
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from the course the Agency had been on

EPA might still pursue MACT controls.
As a result, EPA's preamble reads like an
early white paper on the various policy
alternatives to reduce mercury emissions
from power plants, not like the formal
agency proposal it purports to be.The
Agency ties itself in knots trying to
explain how the law allows it to promulgate either of these diametrically
opposed options.
EPA's various proposals for regulating
mercury from power plants suffer from
numerous legal flaws. Indeed, the sheer
numerousness of EPA's suggestions seems
to us to belie a deep insecurity on the
Agency's part about the legality of its
actions. In several places, the Agency
simply throws out a statutory section that
might -just might! - provide a legal
basis for its proposals, and asks for public
comment on whether the section flies as
a statutory grounding for the agency's
ideas. Especially in a post-Chevron world,
in which judicial deference to agencies'
statutory interpretation is premised in
part on agencies' expertise regarding the
statutes they administer, this hunt-andpeck method of statutory interpretation
is highly dubious.
In any event, even EPA's faill-scale
statutory discussions fall flat. Focusing
only on EPA's attempt to evade section
112's MACT requirements and to
embrace instead a trading program under
either section 111 (pertaining to new
source performance standards) or section
112 of the Act, the following are, in brief,
the fundamental problems with EPA's
proposal, from a legal perspective:
" EPA has not justified deleting power
plants from the section 112 list of
regulated sources.
" Because EPA has not done so, it must
regulate mercury from power plants
under section 112 oftheAct.
" Section 112 does not authorize
EPA to create a trading program in
toxic pollutants.
" Even ifa court could be persuaded to
allow EPA to sidestep section 112, the
Volume 30, Number 2

Agency is not authorized to employ
trading under section 111.
So deep are the legal flaws in EPA's
alternatives that there is virtually no hope
that its final rule wxill survive judicial
review. One thing is guaranteed,
however: it xvill take years before these
issues are resolved and, in the meantime,
mercur- emissions from power plants
will remain uncontrolled or inadequately
controlled. One need not be a hopeless
cynic to vonder whether this Administration, foe of environmental regulation
and friend of the energy industry, thinks
this legal uncertainty with its attendant
delay, is just fine.
For mercury cell chlor-alkali plants, the
legal problems took a different form. In
that instance, EPA did not root around
outside section 112 for legal authority to
avoid strict regulation. Instead, it simply
undermined section 112 itself by so
narrowly classifying the categories subject
to regulation that the agency could, in
effect, grandfather the most antiquated
chlor-alkali plants in the country.
The nine facilities in question are so
outmoded that a new one has not been
built in 30 years.Together, these facilities
"lose" approximately 65 tons of mercury
per year - more than the amount emitted
by all U.S. power plants combined.
Thirty -two of the approximately 43
facilities that manufacture chlorine and
caustic soda use diaphragm or membrane
cells, -hich are significantly more energy
efficient, do not use or emit mercury, and
manage to produce 88 percent of the
nation's chlorine. In fact, some of the
companies that own the nine antiquated
plants have the newer, cleaner technologies operating right next door.Yet rather
than conceding that manufacturing
chlorine and caustic soda using mercury
is not exactly in the avant garde of pollution control, and is certainly not MACT,
EPA simply put the antiquated mercury
cell plants in a category of their own and
announced that they could continue to
operate indefinitely under a system of
almost laughably lenient '-wxork practices," xxwhich have as their centerpiece
visual inspections of the cell room to see
if workers can see whether any mercury
has fallen on the ground. EPA itself is
unable to estimate xxwhether such inspec-
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tions will produce any reductions in
mercury releases.
In proposing a cap-and-trade system
for mercury (and an exceedingly lenient
one at that), and in grandfathering the
most antiquated chlor-alkali facilities in
the country, EPA acted outside the
bounds of the la. In doing so, as we
discuss next, EPA also effectively
dismissed the strong scientific evidence
showing mercury's serious threats to
human health.
Mercurv is a heavv metal that occurs
naturally in the earth's crust and is also
produced by "anthropomorphic"
(manmade) activities. Because mercury is
very "persistent," meaning that it does
not break down easily, it circulates and
re-circulates from air to -waterto soil and
back again without losing its toxic characteristics, producing what scientists call
the "global mercury cycle." Methylmercurv (MeHg), the form of the metal that
is most toxic to people, results from the
interaction between elemental mercur'
and microorganisms in soil and wx
ater.A
very small amount of mercury goes a
very long wvay: as little as a teaspoonful
can contaminate a 2 )-acre lake.
The first step in the EPA's attempts to
reduce industrial mercury emissions was
the establishment of a "reference dose"
for methylmercury of 0.1 tg/kg (microgram per kilogram) body wx
eight per
day. or 5.8 parts per billion in the blood.
A reference dose means the level below
xxwhich xve xvould not expect to see
any adverse health effects. Conversely,
above that level, xxe can expect to see
problems begin.
The EPA'S low number sparked such a
vigorous challenge by industry scientists
that Congress directed the nation's
premier scientific organization to
conduct an extensive reviex of the EPA's
interpretation of all the available science.
However. the NAS panel upheld the
EPA reference dose:
The population at highest risk is the
children of women who consumed
large amounts of fish and seafood
during pregnancy.The committee
concludes that the risk to that population is likely to be sufficient to result in
an increase in the number of children
xxwho have to struggle to keep up in

school and who might require remedial classes or special education.... On
the basis of its evaluation, the committees
conseii'm is that the value ofEPI [reference dose] is a scientificallb'justifiable leltcl
for the protection ofpublic health.
In June 2003, a panel of experts from
the United Nation's Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and theWorld
Health Organization (WHO) followed
the NAS and the EPA lead, voting to cut
the worldwide Provisional Tolerable
Weekly Intake (PTWI) of methylmercurv in food roughly in half, to 1.6
micrograms per kilogram.
Thus, txvo of the world's most eminent
scientific bodies have considered the
question of methylmercury exposure on
public health, and both have concluded
that the EPA'S reference dose is correct.
Moreover, the Centers for Disease
Control (CDC) have assembled statistics
showing that, primarily as a result of this
consumption, eight percent ofnAmerican
women of child-bearing age have levels
of mercury in their bloodstreams that
could harm their unborn children. On
the basis of these results. EPA scientists
have estimated that some 630.1000 American babies out of the four million born
each year have dangerously elevated
blood mercury levels. In addition, the
number of states issuing wxarnings to the
public about the danger of ingesting fish
caught from local rivers, lakes and streams
has risen steadily from 27 in 1993 to 45
in 2002, an increase of 138 percent. Fish
advisories for mercury now cover
12,069,319 lake acres, or close to a third
of all American lakes, and 473,186 river
miles, or close to 13 percent of all American riVer miles.
In this case, scientific research has
recently brought reassuring news along
vith the bad.A study done in Florida
showed that cleaning up local sources in this case municipal and medical waste
incinerators, subjected to strong controls
relatively recently - resulted in irmediate inprovement in the amount of
mercury in large mouth bass, one of the
species most affected by contamnination.
This outcome means that we could
continued on uiext pagc
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Mercury and the Bush Administration
continuedfrom previouspage
make significant progress by cutting
future mercury emissions.
In the story so far, therefore, we have a
substance that EPA is required by law to
regulate strictly and swiftly by requiring
the best available pollution controls for
individual plants, and one that scientific
research has shown poses a grave threat
to human health.At this point, readers
might begin to suspect that the Bush
Administration's exceedingly lax
approach to mercury regulation must
have been the result of an unfavorable
economic analysis of more stringent
rules. But they would be wrong.
EPA's own analysis of its mercury
proposals documented net benefits
(benefits minus costs) of $13 billion from
the regulation of power plants - even

without any calculation of the independent
benefits of reducing the adverse health effects
caused by mercury exposure (e.g., neurological
injury to babies and children).The benefits
that were quantified and monetized were
a regulatory windfall: they were the "cobenefits" associated with reducing sulfur
dioxide (SO,) and nitrogen oxide
(NOx), two air pollutants that are otherwise regulated under new EPA rules
issued around the same time as the
mercury proposal. EPA claimed these cobenefits in the context of its mercury
rule proposals because reducing SO, and
NOx under those other rules will also
result in reductions - as yet unquantifled - of mercury emissions. EPA'S
calculations tend to obscure the single
most remarkable fact about its mercury
proposals: none of the alternatives EPA

suggests with respect to mercury require
utilities to do anything more to control
mercury than they are doing already to
control SO2 and NOX. Only in 2018 at the earliest - will mercury-specific
control requirements kick in, at which
time, under EPA'S proposed trading alternative, total allowable emissions are
reduced further.
Thirteen billion dollars is, as these
things go, a whopper of a net benefit.Yet
the public record reveals that no one neither EPA officials nor the supposedly
cost-benefit-minded economists at the
Office of Management and Budget
(OMB) - asked whether we might get
an even more wonderful cost-benefit
profile if we regulated mercury more
stringently. Indeed, EPA officials ordered
career personnel at the Agency not to
perform the kind of scientific and
economic analysis usually performed for
this kind of rule. And the dominant
concern of the "efficiency" hawks at
OMB appears to have been to make the
risks of mercury appear as low as possible.
Revelations in the press about the
deliberate under-analysis of the mercury
proposal have prompted EPA Admiistrator Mike Leavitt to order new analyses
to be undertaken by EPA staff. Leavitt
has stated that the analyses will be made
available to the public for another round
of cormnents.Yet even as Leavitt was
promising these new analyses,Jeffrey
Holmstead was telling the press that EPA
was devoted to the proposal for trading
mercury emissions.

Allowing trading in mercury would be
a large mistake. In offering its proposal to
allow commercial trading in mercury
emissions, EPA violated several of the
most basic principles for designing an
effective and enforceable trading regime.
Permitting trading in a toxic substance
makes practically inevitable the creation
of dangerous hot spots that threaten the
health of neighborhoods around the
plants. Compounding this overriding
problem, the "cap" EPA proposes to set
on total emissions is exceedingly generous, requiring no new, mercury-specific
controls until 2018 at the very earliest.
By allowing unlimited banking of emissions credits, the Agency has shot holes
through what it calls its "certain, fixed"
(albeit overly generous) cap, with the
embarrassing result that under the
Agency's own modeling, it may be 2026
until mercury emissions are reduced to
half as much as they are now.The weakness of the Agency's trading proposal was
cast in sharp relief by the findings of a
recently released analysis by EPA's Office
of Research and Development showing
that technologies capable of achieving
70-90% reductions will be available as
early as 2010.The trading regime EPA
proposes to create is, quite simply, a disaster waiting to happen.
EPA's proposal cannot be fixed
with tinkering. EPA should withdraw
the proposal and start where it left
off a year ago, when it was still committed to the legally correct and
environmentally preferable MACT
regime for mercury. C)

seriously undermine usage of the Internet.The FTC should take the lead in
crafting workable solutions.
On balance, however, the record is
clear.When the history of the first
century of the FTC is written ten years
from nowTimothyJ. Muris will be

ranked among its top commissioners. His
successor, Ms. Majoras, has inherited the
leading antitrust agency in the U.S. Her
job will be to maintain that role by
building on Muris' legacy. C

A Remarkable Chairman
continuedfrom page 5
deal or price packaging by dominant
firms is particularly murky- and vigorous competition by firms with monopoly
power is inhibited as a consequence.The
regulation of increasing and increasingly
obnoxious e-mail spain, computer viruses
and similar invasions of consumer privacy
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The Federalization of Corporate Governance
By Roberta S. Karmel*

Certifications
("Sarbanes-Odey")l was passed
he response
Sarbanes-OxleyAct
of 2002
of the
to the bursting
in
stock market bubble of the late 1990s and
the uncovering of widespread financial
fraud at large public companies wvhich had
been high fliers during the boom in technology stocks.Without inquiring too
deeply into the reasons for the bubble and
its collapse, or why accounting irregularities at public companies had become so
pervasive, Congress passed Sarbanes-Oxley
to restore investor confidence.The statute
is based primarily on recommendations
from the SEC, and in the process, the SEC
acquired power to regulate corporate
governance at large public companies to a
much greater extent than was previously
the case.As a result, a significant amount of
authority for regulating corporate governance in public corporations passed from
state law and state courts to the SEC. In
addition, the new law is designed to create
a set of adversarial relationships among the
corporate governance players, a possibly
counter-productive development.The
most important of these corporate gover2

nance provisions are set forth below.

*Professor of Lawx and Chair of the Steering
Committee for the Center for the Center for
the Study of International Business Law at
Brooklyn Law School.
'Public Company Accounting Reform and
Investor Protection Act of 2002, Pub. L.No.
107-204,116 Stat. 745 (2002) (codified in scattered sections of 11,15, 18.28 and 29 U.S.C.).
2
The SEC's new regulatory authority over audiand attorneys will not be discussed.
tors
3
These provisions have been implemented by
rules 13a-14, 13a-15,17 C.FR. % 240.13a-14.
13a- 15. See Certification of Disclosure in
Companies' Quarterly andAnnual Reports,
Securities Act Release No. 8124,67 Fed. Reg.
57,276 (Sept. 9, 2C)02).
4
See Management's Report on Internal Control
Over Financial Reporting and Certification of
Disclosure in Exchange Act Periodic Reports,
Exchange Act Release No. 47,986, 68 Fed. Reg.
36,636 (June 2003).
Previously, the SEC could only obtain such bars
by way ofa court order.
6
Item 406 ofRegulation S-K, 17 C.ER.
§ 229.406. See Disclosure Required by Sections
406 and 407 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of2002,
Securities Act Release No. 8177, 68 Fed. Reg.
5110 (Jan. 31,2003).
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Sarbanes-Oxley requires the SEC to
adopt rules requiring the principle executive and financial officers of SEC
registered issuers to certify annual and
quarterly reports filed with the SEC.The
signing officers must certify that he or she
has reviewed the report; it does not
contain untrue or misleading statements; it
fairly presents in all material respects the
financial condition and results of operations of the issuer; and the signing officers
are responsible for establishing and maintaining internal controls, have designed
such controls to ensure that material information is made known to such officers
and others and have evaluated such
controls. Sarbanes-Oxlex, § 302, codified at
15 U.S.C. § 7241 (2002).3 Further, there
are criminal penalties provided for false
certifications. Sarbanes-O-lex, § 906,18
U.S.C. 5 135(0 (2002).A related mandated
disclosure is that companies include in
their annual reports an explanation and
evaluation of their internal controls.
Sarbanes-Oxlex, 5 404, 15 U.S.C. § 7241
(2002). Further, the issuer's auditor must
attest to management's assessment of inter4

nal controls.
The certification provision gives the
SEC direct regulatory authority over
corporate officers of all public companies.

Further, the SEC now has the power to
bar executives from serving as corporate
officers in administrative proceedings,
xithout the need to go to court.

Sarbanes-Oxley § 1105,15 U.S.C.§ 78u-3
(20(02). The SEC could well use this new
authority to regulate corporate officers in
ways not contemplated by the Congress
which passed Sarbanes-Oxley.

Executive Compensation
Although Congress did not try to limit
executive compensation directly, four
provisions of Sarbanes-Oxley are directed
at specific management compensation
abuses. SEC rulemaking was not required
to implement these provisions which are
self-executing. If an issuer is required to

prepare an accounting restatement due to
material noncompliance, as a result of
misconduct, with any financial reporting
requirement under the securities laws, the
CEO and CFO must reimburse the issuer
for any bonus or other incentive based or
equity based compensation and any profits
from the sale of securities of the issuer
during the 12 month period following the
publication of the financial statement
required to be restated. Sarbanes-Oxley
§ 304,15 U.S.C. 5 7243 (2002).To give
some teeth to this provision, the SEC has
been given the authority to obtain asset
freezes to prevent an issuer from paying
bonuses to executives in cases involving
financial fraud. Sarbanes-Oxley, § 1103,15
U.S.C. § 78u-3 (2002). In addition, directors and executive officers of issuers are
prohibited from trading in any equity
securities of the issuer during any black
hen employees are so prohibout period wx
ited. Sarbanes-Oxley

§ 306, 15 U.S.C.

§ 7244 (2(02).

Codes of Ethics
Sarbanes-Oxey requires the SEC to
issue rules to require issuers to disclose
whether or not they have codes of ethics
applicable to senior financial officers.
Sarbanes-Oxley, 5 406,15 U.S.C. § 7264
(20)2).The implementing rules require
issuers to disclose whether a code of ethics
has been adopted in their annual reports
and to file any code with the SEC.6 The

wav in which the SEC defined the term
'code of ethics" is quite broad.
The rules do not specify the exact
details that must be included in a code, or
any specific language that must be used,
and some of the matters that should be
touched upon have been included in
stock exchange or other self-regulatory
organization ("SRO") proposed rules.
The open ended nature of the SarbanesOxley provisions on codes of ethics and
the SEC rules give considerable scope to
the SEC to insert its views concerning
corporate governance into the workings
continued on next page
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The Federalization of Corporate Governance
continuedfrom previous page
of public corporations, either through
fiture enforcement actions or otherwise.

Whistleblowers
Sarbanes-Oxley creates a new civil
cause of action that protects employees of
publicly traded companies who lawfully
provide evidence or otherwise assist in the
investigation of conduct that the employee
"reasonably believes constitutes" violations
of the federal anti-fraud statutes, or SEC
regulations. Sarbanes-Oxley, § 806,18
U.S.C. § 1514A (2002).Another provision
establishes crininal liability for whistleblower retaliation. Sarbanes-Oxley, § 1107,
18 U.S.C. § 1513 (2002). Finally, audit
conmittees of public companies are
required to establish procedures for receiving and dealing with complaints regarding
accounting, auditing or internal accounting controls. Sarbanes-Oxley, §301, 15
U.S.C. § 78j-1 (2002).

Audit Committees
Sarbanes-Oxley gives the SEC the
authority it has long wanted to restructure
corporate audit comrnittees,but it does so
primarily by authorizing the SEC to
direct SROs to change their listing rules to
meet certain standards. Sarbanes-Oxley, 5
301,15 U.S.C. § 78j-1 (2002).Also, a
public company must disclose whether its
audit committee includes at least one
"financial expert." Sarbanes-Oxley, § 407,
15 U.S.C. § 7265 (2002). Sarbanes-Oxley
takes considerable authority for financial
reporting away from management and
places it with the audit committee.
Further, it makes the audit committee a
potential critic and antagonist of the CEO
and CFOThe specific grant of authority
to the SEC to regulate the structure and
duties of audit committees is a significant
7 This is more stringent than prior definitions
of independence utilized for listed company
audit committees.
8The corporations run byWarren Buffet
(Bershire Hathaway),JackWelch (General Electric), Bill Gates (Microsoft), and Hank
Greenberg (AIG) come to mind as examples. See
Helen Stock, BtffetAdnonishes Fund Directors,
WASHINGTON POST,Mar. 7,2004, atA15.
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departure from previous legal theories
regarding the divide between federal and
state law.
Each member of the audit cormmittee
of a listed issuer must be "independent,"
and this term is defined to mean that an
audit committee member may not, other
than in his or her capacity as a board
member, accept any consulting, advisory,
or other fee compensation from the
issuer, or be an affiliated person of the
issuer or any subsidiary. Sarbanes-Oxley,
301,15 U.S.C. § 78j-1 (2002).7The audit
comnmittee must become directly responsible for the appointment, compensation,
and oversight of the work of any registered public accounting firm employed by
the issuer.As already mentioned, audit
committees must establish procedures for
receiving and treating complaints regarding accounting, internal controls or
auditing matters.The audit comrittee
must have the authority to engage independent counsel and other advisers and
be adequately funded.Although all of
these requirements are to be implemented
by SROs rather than SEC rules, the SROs
only have authority to go beyond, not to
derogate from, these mininmm standards.
Taken as a whole, these rules undercut
the long standing principle of state law
that the board of directors as a whole is
responsible for directing the management
and supervising the affairs of a corporation.The audit conmmittee is set up as an
executive committee for certain purposes
and the "financial expert" is set up as a
super committee member. Further, an
adversarial model of governance is substituted for the traditional collegial model of
board governance.The implications of
these changes, in terms of director liability
and board practice, will probably take
some time to be felt and understood.

The Independent Director Model
The keystone of the SEC's corporate
governance policy is the independent
director.The author has long felt that this
model is flawed. Independent directors are
part tame participants in a corporations's
affairs. By definition they are outsiders.

However intelligent, hardworking or
strong minded they may be they do not
have the time or the mandate to challenge
management's judgements except as to a
discrete number of issues. If they spend all
of their time trying to audit the auditors
and assure that executive compensation is
reasonable, they will have no time for
focusing on important business and strategy matters. If they become essentially fil
time directors they will no longer be independent. If they repeatedly challenge the
judgments of a CEO, the CEO will lose
his authority and be forced to resign.
Corporations are essentially hierarchical
and need a strong leader. Some of the
most highly regarded U.S. corporations
have had authoritarian CEOs who have
rewarded shareholders over a long period
of time.8 This does not mean that independent directors are a bad idea, but
corporations should have greater freedom
to experiment with board structures than
they now have under Sarbanes-Oxley.
Further, since the independent director
board simply cannot carry the freight the
SEC has placed upon it, it is bound to
disappoint and cause investor and public
dissatisfaction and loss of confidence.The
collegial board has its flaws and there are
times when management deserves to be
challenged and even thrown out of office,
but the prevailing model has actually
served the U.S. economy well over a long
period of time.The consequences of
changing it, and giving control of board
structure to a federal government agency
are unknown.
Sarbanes-Oxley has given the SEC
extensive authority over CFOs and
outside auditors and attorneys. In the
SEC's view, different players on the corporate team should be watching one another
suspiciously to assure compliance with the
federal securities laws, and should be
prepared to blow the whistle on any errant
CEO.Although such checks on the power
of a bad CEO may be salutary, such checks
on the power of a good CEO may undermine his or her leadership to the point of
diminishing the competitiveness of a business corporation. C-4
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George Burditt
As interviewed by ProfJim O'Reilly*

'A

dmnistrative law, particularly in the food and drug
field, is just fascinating to me. I am 82 years old but
I love every minute of what I do, and there are all

kinds of challenges in it, physical, intellectual, psychological,
all kinds. I can say to a young person entering our field, I have
never had a dull ten seconds in my life in this field."
George M. Burditt ofBell, Boyd in Chicago epitomizes the
class and enthusiasm that separate exceptional players from the

average administrative law practitioner. "Players" is an appropriate term, because his lanky 6'3" frame for the Harvard basketball
team earned him a pro basketball tryout, before succumbing to
law's call to Harvard Law School. George taught txxwo generations of FDA lawyers and many private sector lax-x'ers as he
earned and shared the mastery of this important field of practice.

Is administrative law a good field for law students
to enter?
Definitely, it is a growth field; people will always need guides
through the maze.There vere so few FDA rules when I
entered the field that they could fit comfortably in one small
binder; now there are tens of thousands of pages of rules, guidance documents, policy manuals, etc. It is infinitely more
complex today and good laxwyers are ver' valuable.

What advice do you give younger lawyers about
agency practice?
It can be an absolutely fascinating field.There are many
challenges but it's never dull.

What was your most memorable success against an
administrative agency?
When a federal judge dismissed an FDA criminal case and
then shook his finger at the government's lawyers: "Your case
-,vas so bad it warranted criminal prosecution of the government!" Outside the courtroom, the government's la.vver
retorted that "In the 16th Century they would have
condemned Burditt as a witch!"

How has judicial deference affected the field of
FDA law?
Courts have alwa's deferred to FDA; I see no real difference
compared to the prior years of acceptance of what the FDA
puts before the court.

What are the features of the most successful regulators?
The best regulators really know their stuff.They are thoroughly grounded in FDA laxx, backwxards and forward.When it
comes time to present their case to a court, they are unequivocal, clear, have good factual presentation and great witnesses.
These skills are the same needed for litigating and rulemaking,
just in a different setting.

What marks a regulator who is likely to NOT
succeed?
The person who takes shortcuts, shoots from the hip, and
does not have courage to stand up for a well reasoned position
is likely to fail.The person who takes a wrong position and
refuses to consider how others might have a better understanding won't succeed.To be effective a regulator has to be
committed to reaching reliable results.

What makes for an effective or ineffective agency
counsel?
Fairness is critical.The effective agencx counsel has a thorough grasp of the facts and of the law before the case begins. If
the agency makes a mistake, counsel should acknowledge its
mistake and take the appropriate action. In one case, the
agency's sampling error caused them to reach a mistaken
impression, and later caused them to lose a long and expensive
trial.When I called the agency counsel's office to inquire about
their Equal Access to Justice Act compensation procedures, they
said,"Is this about the case we screwed up in Minnesota?"

What learnings from dealing with FDA have you
applied to other litigation?
Realize that the other lawxyer is also tring to do a good job.
Civility is so verv important; treat the other side with respect
and dignity even while you are making a forceful presentation.
It's unfortunate that today, litigators are unhappy because there
is such un-civil behavior.

What changes have been most significant?
Three things: more rulemaking in place of adjudicatory decisions, and that has reduced the number of hearings before the
agency. Second, there is much more attention to new penalties
and sanctions that were not considered before. And third, the
most significant has been much more attention to politics. If
you can't understand wvhy the agency won't discuss a settlement
or an alternative, why they can't talk about it, there is often a
political pressure driving that decision, where politics had in the
past not been visible. C>

*Past Section Chair and current Advisory Board Member.

Comments and suggestions on the style and content of
this publication should be sent to KnightK9staff.abanet. org.
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The 2004 Administrative Law Conference
ByJohn F Duffy*

tive Law Conference was a
he
Section's 2004
Administratremendous
success.The
conference broke the record from last
year's conference for the most attendees
ever at a Section event.The 2004
conference attracted nearly 700 attendees, including 100 individuals who
purchased passports to all events at the
conference.The conference was attractive to so many precisely because the
panels organized by our Section
members bring together some of the
best thinkers in government, private
practice and academia to discuss and
debate the important issues currently
generating controversy in the field of
administrative law and regulatory policy.
These panels are the heart and soul of
the conference, and the conference's
success pays a fitting tribute to the panel
chairs and other section members who
had a role in organizing them.
The conference also included a
number of very popular special events,
including an opening address by FTC
Chairman Deborah Majoras, the annual
awards luncheon with remarks by Judge
Merrick Garland, an evening reception
at the U.S. Botanical Gardens, and a
special introduction to the year's developments panel by Judge Raymond
Randolph.The conference was capped
off with an evening at the Supreme
Court, which began with a panel of four
former solicitors general discussing advocacy on behalf of the United States and
concluded with an elegant dinner held in
the Great Hall of the Court and hosted
by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor.
The conference would not be possible
without the hard work and support of
many individuals and firms. Section
Chair Randy May, who served as chair of
last year's Conference, lined up the
marquee events and speakers that helped
guarantee the success of the Conference
*Conference Chair; Past Council Member;
and Professor, George Washington University
Law School.
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this year, and many
thanks are due the
members of the
section who
organized panels
for the conference;
they bore the lion's
share of responsibility in making
the conference an
invaluable event
for administrative
practitioners and
scholars. Kimberly

Knight and NicoleSection ChairMay,.JusticeO'Connor,President Grey and President-Elect Greco

Emard worked
at the Supreme Court.
tirelessly to ensure
that the conference was flawless in its
operations, and they succeeded.
Finally, the Section owes a special debt
of gratitude to the following conference
sponsors: Baker & Hostetler LLP; Balch
& Bingham LLP; Crowell & Moring
LLP; Foley & Lardner LLP; Gibson,
Dunn & Crutcher LLP; Haynes &
Boone LLP; Hunton &Williams LLP;
Jenner & Block LLP; Kirkland & Ellis
LLP; Kelley Drye &Warren LLP; Latham
&Watkins LLP; Paul, Hastings,Janofsky
&Walker LLP; PorterWright Morris &
Arthur LLP; Proskauer Rose LLP; Ropes
& Gray LLP; Sidley Austin Brown &
Wood LLP;Wiley Rein & Fielding LLP;
andWilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and
Dorr LLP
Though it would be impossible to give
a flail sense of the conference in this
newsletter, below is a sampling of some
excerpts from the principal addresses at
the conference. Finally, don't forget to
attend next year's Fall Conference.

ChairmanMajoras

The Honorable
Deborah Platt Majoras,
Chairman,Federal
Trade Commission,
opened the conference
with an address about
administrative revitalization at the FTC:

I had the good fortune to come to the
FTC shortly before the late September
celebration of the 90th Anniversary of the
signing of the FTC Act. Current
Commission members and employees joined by FTC alumni, practitioners, and
scholars - marked this anniversary with
a two-day symposium examining the
agency's history, its failures, and its
triumphs. Even the most casual student of
the FTC and its past would have been
struck by the atmosphere of the celebration - the pride in recent successes and
the satisfaction in overcoming past shortcomings, both wisely tempered by a keen
commitment to improve to meet the
inevitable new challenges.This morning I
want to use the occasion of the recent
Symposium and the reflection it
prompted to discuss the lessons that experience has taught about the ingredients of
good administrative practice.The FTC
transformed itself from an object of
ridicule in the late 1960s to a place of
respect among public institutions (not to
mention a place of heroism among
members of the public whose dinners no
longer are interrupted by irritating telemarketing calls).The transformation bears
most directly on the formulation of
competition and consumer protection
policy,but I suggest that it offers lessons
for the administrative process generally.
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The literature on the first half-century
of the FTC presents a narrative of many
failures interrupted by some intervals of
accomplishment. Critical commentary
reached a peak in the late 1960s. In 1969,
President Nixon, spurred by a scathing
report by Nader's Raiders, asked the
American Bar Association ("ABA") to
appraise the FTC's performance.The
Nader Report said,"Misguided leadership is the malignant cancer that has
already assumed control of the Commission, that has been silently destroying it,
and that has spread its contagion on the
growing crisis of the American
consumer."With greater reserve, the
President said the Commission "may
have failed to discharge [its] obligations
satisfactorily."
The ABA assembled a 16-member,
blue-ribbon panel. Fifteen members of
the panel, which, led by Miles Kirk-

dedication, and with xvise direction
from committees such as these, the
Commission, in their viexx; can still be
redeemed for socially productive
activities. I am not so sanguine.
Given this history, you may wonder
what we had to celebrate on the FTC'S
90th Anniversary. Hov did we get from
the dark days of failure and frustration to
the FTC that I joined two months ago
with its effective competition and
consumer protection programs? I suggest
three findamental improvements. First.
the Commission clarified its mission in
both the competition and consumer
protection agendas and accordingly
deployed its resources to stop the most
egregious consumer harm. Second, the
Commission began to use its unique
capabilities to better understand the
marketplace and the efficacy of its
actions.And,
finally, the
Commission
began to cooperate with other
agencies to more
effectively advance
its goals.

The agency I
have justjoined at
its 90th AnniverSection Chair 'vtay uithformer Solctors General Waxnaan, Dellinger and OLson
at the Supreme Court.

patrick, came to be known as the
Kirkpatrick Commission,joined in a
report that was quite critical of the FTC
and made strong recommendations for
fundamental change. Richard Posner, as
you know now a judge on the United
States Court ofAppeals for the Seventh
Circuit, served on the Kirkpartick
Commission as the 16th member and
did not join in the report's recommendations. SaidJudge Posner at the time:
My colleagues of the majority, xwhile
filly conscious of the Commission's
deficient performance of more than
50 years, maintain a resolute air of
optimism.With better leadership and
better staff,with greater appropriations, with a renewed sense of
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sary is strong,

effective, and
innovative. In fact,
wx
e even had the confidence to invite
Judge Posner to be the featured speaker
at our celebratory dinner last month.
While he recognized that the FTC had
transformed itself- and joked about
being invited to eat crow with us - he
also offered some cautions for the fiture.
We welcome his thoughtfiul cautions and
suggestions and any others. Celebration
of what a talented staff has achieved
through hard work is permitted; stuckin-place, self-satisfaction is not.
ihe Honorable Alerrick B. Gardad,
CircuitJudgefior the U S. Court of-Ippcals
for the D.C. Circuit, delivered a-dd:rcs at
the Sectio }Awvards Lincheon, u'hich
presented the Section'S annualAuardfor
Sciolarship to Protfessor Stc 'ctn Crole, of tile

L -itersit),ofAMichigan
Lail, School, and the
Section ' . Lir), C.
Lawton Outstanding
Governiment Service
Ai turd to Thoumas
Spahr,Chief Legal
Counselfor the Child
Judge Garland
Support Diision of the
Nen' Mfexico Hunian
Scr'ices Departnient.JudgeGarlands address
u'as entitled "Scholars and Public Servants at
the Founding (of theAP1)" and began wiith a
history of the Section's role in pressingfor
enactment of an administrativeprocedure
reform statute:
Judging from the warm reception that
Mr. Spahr and Professor Croley have
received here this afiernoon, one Imght
wxell conclude that administrative law is a
collegial, noncontroversial field. Indeed,
you may- recall that when Justice
Brever
the first recipient of this
Section's Scholarship Award - -,vas
nominated to the Supreme Court, his
confirmation hearings were described as
"dull" seminars in administrative laxx; It
was a topic, one reporter said, "known to
make [the] eyes glaze over."
But things were not always so. In fact,
the debate that led to the adoption of the
Administrative Procedure Act in 1946
was anything but collegial and noncontroversial.To the contrary. the founding
of the APA, like the founding of our
nation itself, was marked by sharp
conflict, energetic discussion, and some
good old fashioned name-calling. As
Professor George Shepherd - another
xxinner of this Section's Scholarship
Award - reminded us in his excellent
article on the history of the APA. both
sides in that conflict saw themselves as
fighting a "pitched political battle for the
life of the New Deal.'"Draxxing on
Professor Shepherd's work and other
sources. I thought I nmght take this
opportunity to put our current era of
good feeling in historical perspective.
Right at the heart of the pitched battle
of the 1930s was this very organization,
the Administrative Lav Section of the
ABA. First established in 1933, it was
known then as the Special Committee
on Adminstrative Law.

contined on next page
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The 2004 Administrative Law Conference
continuedfrom previous page
for a new overarching tribunal, the
Ad Law Committee proposed
sweeping procedural reforms....
The ABA soon
handed responsibility for
managing its new
game plan to
Section ChairRandy May, Subcommittee Co-Chair Cynthia Farina,Scholarship
Roscoe Pound, a
Award recipient Prqf Steven Croley, Outstanding Government SewiceAward
recipientThomas Spahr,and Subcommittee Co-ChairDavid Frederick at annual
giant of the legal
avards luncheon.
profession who
had just completed
Early on, the Committee's chief
a 20-year tenure as Dean of Harvard Law
concern was that the New Deal agencies
School.The ABA brought Pound in to
were wielding an inappropriate combinachair the Administrative Law Comnittee
tion oflegislative and judicial power. In
for just one year, but in that year he
"transformed the debate."As Walter Gellthe first of many apocalyptic predictions,
the Conurnittee's 1934 Report warned
horn later put it, when Pound entered
that "the judicial branch of the federal
the conversation, "the decibel count rose
government is being rapidly and seriously
markedly." Erwin Griswold, no shrinking
undermined" by administrative tribunals,
violet himself, described Pound as an
and is "in danger of meeting a measure of
"intense,""sometimes irascible" man.
the fate of the Merovingian kings."A dire
According to Griswold, Pound "never
warning, to be sure, but perhaps too
wore a coat, no matter how cold the
obscure a reference to the 8th Century
weather."The ABA certainly knew how
Franks to have had much impact back in
to pick a tough champion.
the days before Google searches.
Plunging into the thick of the battle,
To control the agencies, the 1934
Pound authored the Ad Law CommitReport proposed the "establishment of a
tee's 1938 Report, which embellished on
[single] federal administrative court" that
the Committee's previous references to
would take over all agency adjudications.
the Star Chamber and Caligula.The
The recommendation of the ComnimitNew Deal agencies, the Report thundered, were engaged in "adimistrative
tee's 1935 Report was less sweeping, but
absolutism," a "Marxian idea."The
still insisted that "[w]e should not have
Report warned that:"In the fascist counsome 73 midget courts inWashington,
tries executive government is freed of
most of them exercising legislative and
popular review by reference crudely to
executive as well as judicial powers."
principles of leadership[;] ... in other
Widening its
historical references and
countries more subtly by reference to the
ratcheting up its rhetoric, the ABA
importance of the expert in solving
Committee compared administrative
complex problems."...
agencies to the Star Chamber ofTudor
Now, as you might imagine, supporters
England and to the policies of the
of
the agencies did not appreciate the
Roman Emperor Caligula.
ABA's
attack. One of those supporters
Notwithstanding the Coin-nittee's
was
James
Landis, who had succeeded
colorful invective, Round One went to
Roscoe
Pound
as Dean of Harvard Law
the midget courts.The ABA's effort to
School.
Landis
was one of the principal
pass a bill creating a federal administrative
authors
of
the
Securities
and Exchange
court died in Congress. So in 1937, the
ABA changed tactics. Instead of lobbying
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Act of 1934, and had served as an original
member and then Chairman of the SEC.
In an article in the Harvard Law
Review, Landis wondered how "'epithets
and encomiums" could have come to
"play such a part" in the debate over
administrative law. Landis complained
that, although "the rise of the administrative process is by all odds the most
significant development in legal history
in the last century[,] its implications ...
are handled by scholars as if these issues
were political in nature." Implicitly
chiding the dean who preceded him,
Landis wrote that scholarly study of the
administrative process should "offer no
opportunity for ringing speeches against
the rise of arbitrary power for the postprandial delight of bar association
audiences." Out of respect for Landis,
this postprandial speech will contain
no ringing....

The HonorableA.
Raymond Randolph
delivered opening
remarks at the Conferences Friday morning
panel on Developments
in Administrative Law.
Judge Randolphs
Judge Randolph

address offered a reply to
an article in the November, 2003, edition of the Duke Lawjournal
entitled "'Vacation'at Sea:JudicialRemedies
and Equitable Discretion in Administrative
Law" by ProfessorRonald Levin of the Washington University in St. Louis.Judge
Randolph 's address was entitled 'Judicial
Remediesfor UnlawfulAgency Action"; the
excerpt below isfrom the beginning:
Randy asked me to speak about an
unresolved issue in our court.The issue is
whether a court, after finding agency
action arbitrary and capricious or otherwise unlawfuil under the APA, has the
option ofjust remanding the case to the
agency without vacating the illegal rule
or order. Ron Levin, in an outstanding
piece of scholarship, has analyzed the
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subject in great depth. Ron's article,
xwhich is about 100 pages long with
more than 400 footnotes, comes to a
conclusion different than mine. Randy
has given me 15 minutes to reply.
When I say the remand-only issue is
unresolved, I do not mean that our court
has never simply remanded agency cases
without vacating. Far from it.There have
been a fair number of such cases and the
number is on the rise. Before 1993, 1
think remanding without vacating was
done without much thought and,
perhaps, inadvertently- that is,the court
intended to vacate also but said only
"remanded."We traditionally sign off our
opinions vith "so ordered" or"affirmed" or
"disinissed" and even occasionally
"Irversed,"
always in italics, flush right. I
suspect not much attention xxas paid to
the large difference betveen "remanded"
and "vacated and remnanded'. It was as if-xxe
were ending a letter xith "sincerely"
instead of"sincerely yours," without
paying much attention to the choice.

Things changed, but only for axhile.
after Checkosk,' SEC came down in the
spring of 1993.The case was quite
complicated.The SEC had suspended
two CPA's for engaging in "improper
professional conduct' when they
conducted audits of a major corporation.
Although the parties argued about
many difficult issues, the question of
relief was not one of them. I thought
then, and think today, that under the
APA, courts must vacate illegal agency
action - xxwhich is what I wrote in mY
opinion. For reasons that are still a
mystery to me, my colleague on the
panel xxanted just to remand the case to
the SEC. His separate opinion never
attempted to parse the language of§ 706
of the APA.The third member of the
panel, a visiting district judge, voted to
uphold the SEC, which left remand only
as the least common denominator.
The relevant language in APA section
706(2)(a) is this:
a reviexving court, faced xxwith arbitrary,
capricious or othervise illegal agency

action, "shall hold unlawfiA and set
aside" the agency action.
Set aside means to vacate, according to
the dictionaries and common understanding. And "shall" means "must." I see
no play in the joints.The rule is hard and
fast. No opinion for our court has ever
confronted the language of§ 706.
Remanding without vacating is just
done. My colleague in Checkosk,
thought this made it right. It does not.
His position reminded me of a line from
A Tale ofTvo Cities: "wxhatever is, is right,
which involves the troubling proposition
that nothing that ever -,,as,was wrong."
In contrast, Professor Levin - and this
section in a 1997 resolution - marshaled
some arguments against my interpretation of5 706.1 do not find them
persuasive. I xviii deal with them briefly
and then explain why I believe that just
remanding is not only a violation of the
APA, but also bad policy. C)
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he administrative law-related interest of the Supreme
Court's work this quarter comes primarily from the

Court's statutory interpretation.The Court again
signaled this quarter that it is, perhaps, returning to a broader
and more inclusive statutory interpretation methodology.

In October, the Court decided Leocal v.Ashcroft, - U.S.-,
125 S.Ct. 377 (Oct. 12,2004), which reviewed the Eleventh
Circuit's affirmance of the Board of Immigration Appeals' order
to deportJosue Leocal because of Leocal's 2000 Florida conviction for driving under the influence of alcohol and causing
serious bodily injury.The issue for the Supreme Court was
whether that drunk driving conviction qualified as a "crime of
violence" under 18 U.S.C. § 16, and hence as an "aggravated
felony" under section 237(a) of the Immigration and NationalityAct (INA). 8 U.S.C. 5 1227(a)(2) (A)(iii).
INA section 237(a) provides that"[a]ny alien who is
convicted of an aggravated felony ...
is deportable" at the order
of the Attorney General. Id. Under the INA, an "aggravated
felony" includes "a crime of violence (as defined in section 16
of title 18, but not including a purely political offense) for
which the term of imprisonment [is] at least one year." 8 U.S.C.
§ 1101(a)(43)(F). Section 16 ofTitle 18, in turn, defines "crime
of violence" to be:
(a) an offense that has as an element the use, attempted use,
or threatened use of physical force against the person or
property of another, or
(b) any other offense that is a felony and that, by its nature,
involves a substantial risk that physical force against the
person or property of another may be used in the course
of committing the offense.
18 U.S.C. § 16.The Supreme Court granted certiorarito
resolve a circuit split "on the question whether state DUI
offenses similar to the one in Florida, wx
hich either do not have
a means rea component or require only a showing of negligence
in the operation of a vehicle, qualify as a crime of violence."
125 S.Ct. at 380. In a unanimous opinion authored by Chief
Justice Rehnquist, the Court concluded that they do not.
The Court began its process of statutory interpretation by
noting that section 16 "directs our focus to the 'offense' of
conviction," requiring the Justices "to look to the elements and
the nature of the offense of conviction, rather than to the
particular facts relating to the petitioner's crime." Id. at 381.
Noting that the Florida statute required proof of causation of
injury but not of mental state, the Court then emphasized that
"[t]he plain text of§ 16(a) states that an offense, to qualify as a
*Associate Professor of Law. Indiana University School of Lav Indianapolis; and Contributing Editor.
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crime of violence, must have 'as an element the use, attempted
use, or threatened use of physical force against the person or
property of another."' Id. at 382. Rejecting the government's
narrow focus on the dictionary, legislative, and case law meanings of"use" and its argument that the "use" of force does not
necessarily imply a mens rea component, the Court determined
instead that "the parties' primary focus on that word is too
narrow. Particularly when interpreting a statute that features as
elastic a word as 'use,' we construe language in its context and in
light of the terms surrounding it." Id. (quoting Smith i).United
States, 208 US. 223,229 (1993); Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S.
137, 143 (1995)).As a result, for purposes of interpretation,
"[t]he critical aspect of§ 16(a) is that a crime of violence is one
involving the 'use ... of physical force against the person orproperty of anothe"- a context in which 'use' requires active
employment." Id. "When interpreting a statute" the Court
declared,"we must give words their 'ordinary or natural'
meaning" and in context the emphasized phrase "most naturally suggests a higher degree of intent than negligent or merely
accidental conduct." Id.As a result, the DUI conviction was not
a "crime of violence" under section 16(a).
Similar logic lead the Court to conclude that the DUI
conviction did not fit within section 16(b), either.While
"[s]ection 16(b) sweeps more broadly than 5 16(a)," it "does not
thereby encompass all negligent misconduct, such as the negligent operation of a vehicle." Id. at 382-83. Because section
16(b),like section 16(a),involves the use of physical force
against the person or property of another, "we must give the
language in § 16(b) an identical construction, requiring a
higher mens rea than the merely accidental or negligent conduct
involved in a DUI offense." Id. Unlike in burglaries, for
example,"[i]n no "ordinary or natural" sense can it be said that
a person risks having to 'use' physical force against another
person in the course of operating a vehicle wvhile intoxicated
and causing injury." Id.
More general considerations reinforced the Supreme Court's
interpretation.Thus, wvith respect to congressional intent,
"[i]nterprering 5 16 to encompass accidental or negligent
conduct would blur the distinction between the "violent' crimes
Congress sought to distinguish for heightened punishment and
other crimes:" Id. at 384. Similarl'.- other provisions in the INA
also suggested that Congress sought to distinguish DUIs from
violent crimes, especially section 101(h), xwhich explicitly distinguishes crimes "of violence" under section 16 from "any crime
of reckless driving or of driving while intoxicated or under the
influence of alcohol or of prohibited substances..... Id. (quoting
8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) (2)(E)).As a result, the fact of a national drunk
driving problem "does not wxarrant our shoehorning [drunk
driving] into statutory sections where it does not fit." Id.
In November, the Supreme Court issued another contextbased interpretive opinion in Koons Buick Pontiac GMC, Inc.
continued on next page
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U.S.-,-- S. Ct.-,

2004 WL 2707418 (Nov.30,

2004). Prior to 1995, it was clear that the Truth in Lending Act's
(TILA's) civil liability provision, 15 U.S.C. 5 1640(a)(2)(A),
imposed a $1,000 cap on statutory damages for both actions
related to loans secured by personal property (clause (i)) and
actions related to consumer loans (clause (ii)). In 1995, however,
Congress amendedTILA to impose a $2,000 cap on statutory
damages in actions related to credit transactions secured by real
property (clause (iii)), leaving the $1,000 cap's continued reference to clause (i) ambiguous.The Eastern District ofVirginia
held that the $1,000 cap no longer applied to clause (i) actions,
and the Fourth Circuit affirmed.
In an 8-1 decision authored by Justice Ginsburg (Justice
Scalia dissented), the Supreme Court reversed the Fourth
Circuit, holding that the $1,000 cap for actions "under this
subparagraph" applies to both clause (i) and clause (ii).The
majority noted that "[1]ess-than-meticulous drafting of the
1995 amendment created an ambiguity" in the subparagraph's
references, id. at *3, and it approached this ambiguity by
emphasizing that "[s] tatutory construction is a 'holistic
endeavor."' Id. at *7 (citations omitted). Relying on the overall
statutory structure, Congress's normal hierarchical scheme in
structuring, and the history ofTILA's amendment, including its
legislative history, the majority concluded that "[t]here is scant
indication that Congress meant to alter the meaning" of the
other damages limitations by adding clause (iii); instead," [b]y
adding clause (iii), Congress sought to provide increased recovery
when aTILA violation occurs in the context of a loan secured
by real property." Id. at *8. "Had Congress simultaneously
meant to repeal the longstanding $100/$1,000 limitation on §
1640 (2) (A)(i),thereby confining the $100/$1,000 limitation
solely to clause (ii), Congress likely would have flagged that
substantial change." Id.
Justice Stevens and Justice Scalia both wrote individual opinions to comment on the Court's statutory interpretation
methodology. In concurrenceJustice Stevens praised the
majority's "common sense" use of legislative history to avoid an
absurd plain meaning reading, noting that "[c]ommon sense is
often more reliable that rote repetition of canons of statutory
construction. It is unfortunate that wooden reliance on those
canons has led to unjust results from time to time. Fortunately,
today the Court has provided us with a lucid opinion that
reflects the sound application of common sense." Id. at *9 (J.
Stevens, concurring).Justice Scalia, in contrast, criticized the
Court's departure from a strict textualist approach:
I hardly think it "scant indication" of intent to alter that
Congress amended the text of the statute by moving the exception from the end of the list to the middle, making it
impossible, without doing violence to the text, to read the
exception as applying to the entire list. Needless to say, I also
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disagree with the Court's reliance on things that the sponsors
and floor managers of the 1995 amendmentfailed to say. I
have often criticized the Court's use of legislative history
because it lends itself to a kind of ventriloquism.The
Congressional Record or committee reports are used to
make words appear to come from Congress's mouth which
were spoken or written by others (individual Members of
Congress, congressional aides, or even enterprising lobbyists).
The Canon of Canine Silence that the Court invokes today
introduces a reverse - and at least equally dangerous phenomenon, under which courts may refuse to believe
Congress's own words unless they can see the lips of others
moving in unison.
Id. at *13.
These differences in statutory interpretation approach will
likely continue to play into the Supreme Court's opinions this
term, because this quarter the Court heard oral argument in
two other cases where statutory interpretation will be critical to
its decisions. On October 6, the Court heard argument in

Cooper Industries,Inc. v.Aviall Services, Inc., 312 E3d 677

(5th

Cir. 2002), cert.granted, 124 S. Ct. 981 (Jan. 9, 2004), oral argument
transcript, 2004WL 2290642 (Oct. 6,2004), which involves the
issue of whether "a private party who has not been the subject
of an underlying civil action for environmental cleanup costs
pursuant to CERCLA [the Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. §5 96019675] [may] bring a CERCLA action seeking contribution, to
recover costs spent voluntarily to clean up properties contaminated by hazardous substances... 2004WL 2290642, at *1.
CERCLA allows the federal and state governments, pursuant
to sections 9606 and 9607, to require statutorily designated
-'responsible parties" to clean up polluted properties or to reimburse the governments' cleanup efforts. Parties who have paid
for such cleanups under government order are then clearly
allowed to seek contribution for those costs against other
responsible parties, so long as those other parties have not
already settled their liability with the government. See 42
U.S.C. § 9613(). CERCLA is decidedly ambiguous, however,
regarding the ability of responsible parties not under government order to voluntarily clean up the property and then seek
contribution:
Any person may seek contribution from any other person
who is liable or potentially liable under section 9607(a) of

this title, during orfollowing any civil action under section 9606 of
this title or undersection 9 607(a) of this title. Such claims shall be
brought in accordance with this section and the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure, and shall be governed by Federal
law. In resolving contribution claims, the court may allocate
response costs among liable parties using such equitable
factors as the court determines are appropriate. Nothing in this
subsection shall diminish the right of any person to bring an actionfor
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contribution in the absence of a civil action undersection 9606 of this
title or section 9607 of this title.

42 U.S.C. § 9613(f).The Fifth Circuit construed this section
to allow contribution actions, regardless of whether a government order had issued.The Supreme Court's resolution of this
question could significantly illuminate some of its principles of
statutory interpretation, given the blatant ambiguity in section
9613(f)(1), the lack of strong agency interpretation, and
CERCLA's longstanding reputation as being one of Congress's
most poorly drafted statutes.
On November 3, the Court heard argument on the issue of
whether disparate impact claims are cognizable under the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. % 621
et seq., in Smith v. City ofJackson, Mississippi,351 E3d 183
(5t Cir. 2003), cert.granted,124 S. Ct. 1724 (March 29, 2004),
oral argument transcript,2004 WL 2607536 (Nov 3, 2004). In a

case of first impression, the Fifth Circuit concluded that the
ADEA did not support disparate impact age discrimination
cases, although disparate treatment cases were cognizable. One
of the more interesting discussions in oral argument centered

on the level of deference to be accorded to the interpretations
of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC) - Chevron deference, Skidmore deference, or no deference at all.
Outside of the realm of statutory interpretation, in October
the Supreme Court granted certiorarito the case of Lingle v.
Chevron USA, Inc., 125 S. Ct. 314 (Oct. 12,2004). on appeal
from the Ninth Circuit. Chevron USA, Inc. v.Bronster,363 E3d
846 (9fh Cir. 2004).This case involves the relationship among
substantive due process, Fifth Amendment regulatory "takings,"
and deference to state legislative decisions that economic regulation will substantially advance legitimate state interests.The
case focuses on Hawaii's Act 257, -which regulates the
maximum rent that oil companies can charge dealers who lease
service stations from those oil companies.The Ninth Circuit
affirmed the district court in holding that the statute constituted an unconstitutional regulatory taking because it did not
substantially advance Hawaii's interest in lowering consumer
gasoline prices, over Hawaii's arguments that: (1) the statute xxas
an economic regulation that should be evaluated under the
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Agency Adjudication
Rulemaking Strategy
" The Right to Participate and Respond
* Rulemaking and Politics:The Intersection of Power,
" Procedural Requirements for Rulemaking
Politics, and Rulemaking
The program xxii be held at the Renaissance Washington, D.C. Hotel. For complete program details, visit
www.abanet.org/adminlaw/institute. You may also contact the Administrative Law Section at (2(02) 662-1528 or
emardn@staff.abanet.org
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Standing: Critters lose (but the door's still open),
while organizations may have a new opening in
"informational standing."
In two notable recent standing decisions, the 9th Circuit
denied standing to animals as plaintiffs, but the 6td Circuit
recognized a form of"informational standing" that would
expand the right of environmental organizations to sue on their
own behalf, rather than on behalf of affected members. In the
first case, Cetacean Community v. Bush, 386 E3d 1169 (9th Cir.
2004), the plaintiff was said to be the "Cetacean Community"
of the world's whales, dolphins, and porpoises.The Cetacean
Community challenged the U.S. Navy's reliance upon certain
sonar devices for the purpose of detecting silent submarines.
The Cetaceans brought the action pursuant to the Endangered
Species Act, the Marine Mammal Protection Act, the National
Environmental Protection Act, and the Administrative Procedure Act.
Decades afterJustice Douglas lost the argument that trees
should have standing, Sierra Club v. Morton, 402 U.S. 727,742
(1972) (Douglas,J, dissenting), it may come as a surprise that an
attorney would seek standing for animals in their own right. It
turns out, however, that the 9th Circuit had practically invited

such an argument. In Palilav.Hawaii Departmentof Land and
Natural Resources, 852 E2d 1106, 1107 (9th Cir. 1988), the court
had written that the endangered Hawaiian Palila bird, "has legal
status and wings its way into federal court as a plaintiff in its
own right," and that the Palilahad "earned the right to be capitalized since it is a party to these proceedings."The court made
quick work of counsel's reliance upon the Palilalanguage.The
language was dicta because there were other parties acknowledged to have standing.The broad assertions, it said, were "little
more than rhetorical flourishes."
Neither story nor doctrine ends there, however. Indeed, the
Cetacean Community came surprisingly close.The 9d, Circuit
held that the Community could meet the constitutional test of
"injury in fact."Just as Article III does not preclude standing for
artificial entities such as corporations or for incompetent
people, it does not preclude animals from functioning as plaintiffs.Thus, the question is whether Congress, in the relevant
statutes, has authorized lawsuits on behalf of animals.The court
held it had not.The Endangered Species Act provides a cause of
action for any "person," a term that is defined so as to exclude
animals.Actions under the other statutes would depend upon
Section 702 of the APA, which refers to a "person" adversely
affected or aggrieved by agency action.The court was not
prepared to read that use of the term "person" broadly enough
to include animals in the absence of clear congressional guid*C. Blake McDowell Professor of LawThe University ofAkron School of
Law;Vice ChairJudicial Review Cornmiattee; and Contributing Editor.
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ance to that effect. Finally, the court refused to recognize associational standing, both because the individual animal "members"
could not have standing and because there was no real association for this purpose. Still, the court has signaled the way to
attempt to create standing for animals or trees in the future.The
right language in a future enactment may have counsel arguing
directly on behalf of dolphins, whales, or even trees.
At first blush,American CanoeAss'n, Inc. v. City of Louisa Water
& Sewer Com'n, 2004)WL 2423536 (6th Cir. 2004) is an even
simpler case. In large part, it is merely Laidlau, redux. See Friends
of the Earth,Inc. v.Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. Inc., 528 U.S. 167, (2000).
In American Canoe,An environmental organization (the Sierra
Club) had standing to challenge violations of the CleanWater
Act based upon its member's affidavit demonstrating use of the
river in question.Apparently seeking to avoid Laidlaw's stringent mootness test, the defendant argued that the plaintiffs
could not meet the redressability prong of the standing test
because by the time of the remand the defendant would have
eliminated the violations.The court would have none of it.
Applying Laidlaw, the court held that the record did not
support a conclusion that it was "absolutely clear" that the
violations would not recur.
The case goes beyond Laidlaw, however, in recognizing that
both the Sierra Club and the American Canoe Association had
"informational standing" to bring the action on their own
behalf. Since the Association had not sought representational
standing, this was the only basis on which it could be heard.
The groups alleged that "the defendants' monitoring and
reporting violations affected its efforts to "research the compliance status of Kentucky dischargers ... and to report the results
of that research to [its] members; to propose legislation ... and
to bring litigation to prevent violation of the discharge limitations in the permit and thereby protect the waters affected by
the facility's discharge."The central issue was whether this allegation was merely a "generalized grievance" that could not
support prudential standing. Struggling to find guidance from
FEC v.Akins and Public Citizen v. US. Departmentqfjustice, the
6th Circuit said,"the injury alleged is not that the defendants are
merely failing to obey the law, it is that they are disobeying the
law in failing to provide information that the plaintiffs desire
and allegedly need.This is all that plaintiflf should have to allege
to demonstrate informational standing where Congress has
provided a broad right of action to vindicate that informational
right."The key to this holding appears to be the proposition
that without the information in question, "American Canoe's
and Sierra Club's daily operations are stymied to the extent that
they can no longer honor their own monitoring and reporting
obligations to their members."
Judge Kennedy dissented as to "informational standing"
unrelated to harm to one of an organization's members.
Arguing that this outcome eliminated the constraints of Sierra
Club v.MortonJudgeKennedy found that the Anerican Canoe
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Association had established nothing more than a "special interest' which was insufficient to support standing.Judge Kennedy
distinguished Akins and Public Citizen on the ground that those
cases involved statutes specifically designed to provide infornmation.The information was the benefit of the statute, so lack of
information was the harm. By contrast, the Clean Water Act
does not create a "specific right to information." Thus, the Association had established nothing more than an interest in
enforcing an environmental statute, a generalized grievance.
MoreoverJudge Kennedy argued that the Association had not
suffered injury at all because, despite the reporting violations,
the plaintiffs had been able to identify several hundred
discharge violations, more than enough information to permit
them to pursue the legislative and other interests that they had
alleged were harmed by the reporting violations.

Second Circuit uses Barnhart multi-factor
analysis to apply Chevron deference to
an agency policy statement.
In Kruse v.Wells Fargo Home Mortgage., Inc.,
383 E3d 49 (2d
Cir. 2004), the Second Circuit explicitly applied the multifactor test suggested in Barnhartv.I 'alton, 535 U.S. 212 (200)2),
to hold that a HUD policy statement was entitled to Chevron
deference.The substantive question in the case was whether
certain overcharges or markups for settlement services violated
the Real Estate Settlement Procedure Act's prohibition on
charges for which services were not actually provided.The
court first held that the statutory language clearly and unambiguously did not extend to overcharges, thus resolving the first
issue at Chevron Step 1.The more interesting aspect of the case
is the analysis of the statute's application to "markups;' as to
which the statute was ambiguous.
HUD had published in the Federal Register a Policy Statement to the effect that markups xiolated the statute.The
Second Circuit, citing Mead, acknowledged that Chevron deference is due only where Congress has delegated to the agency
the authority to issue an interpretation xxith the force of law
and where the agency has acted pursuant to that authority.
HUD had issued the interpretation without any public
comment or other public process.The court said, however, that
"notice-and-comment rulemaking is not a sine qua non of
Chevron deference." Rather, quoting Barnhart i.
Walton, the court
held that Chevron deference depends on "to what extent the
underlying statute suffers from exposed gaps in policies, especially if the statute itself is very complex, as well as on the
agency's expertise in making such policy decisions, the importance of the agency's decisions to the administration of the
statute, and the degree of consideration the agency has given
the relevant issues over time."
Applying these criteria, the court held that the informal
Policy Statement was entitled to Chevron deference. First, the

Winter 2005
Winter 2005

court noted that the statute granted the Secretary the authority
"to prescribe such rules and regulations, [and] to make such
interpretations ... as may be necessary to achieve the purposes
of" the statute. Since HUD had explicitly invoked this authority in publishing the Policy Statement in the Federal Register
and had explicitly distinguished it from other informal statements of lesser stature, the court held that HUD effectively
implemented the necessary delegation of"force of law" authority. Second, disagreeing with the Seventh Circuit, the court
noted the agency's history of detailed consideration of the issue
and rejected the proposition that this vas merely a "set of offthe-cuff remarks."Third, the court noted HUD's extensive
substantive expertise in the area, and fourth it noted that other
circuits had deferred with respect to a different interpretation
addressed in the Policy Statement.
Where does this leave us with respect to determining
whether an agency statement is entitled to Chevron deference?
Most agencies should be able to demonstrate significant internal
deliberation with respect to significant interpretations, and most
should be able to demonstrate substantial expertise with respect
to the substantive area in question.Thus, in the Second Circuit,
at least, the explicit authority to issue interpretations appears to
be the linchpin, even if that authority is exercised without any
public process.As long as the agency issues such an interpretation in the Federal Register or in some comparably significant
form, it xll have a strong argument for Chevron deference.

D.C. Circuit Upholds DOT Rule Despite Inadequate
Chevron Step 2 Explanation and Notice-andComment Challenge
The September 11, 2001, terrorist attack halted all US
commercial flights, xxhich hurt the airline industry financiallx.
In response, Congress enacted the Air Transportation Safety and
System Stabilization Act, under xvhich the industry could
receive some compensation for those losses.To implement the
Act, the Department of'Transportation pursued what turned
out to be a four-step rulemaking process. DOT promptly
issued wx
hat it called the First Final Rule. Relying upon the
"good cause" exception, DOT issued the rule xvithout notice
and comment. In so doing, DOT sought comment on the rule
it had just issued. DOT responded to those comments in the
Second Final Rule, which it made immediately effective.Again,
the agency sought post-hoc public comment. Some months
later, DOT issued the Third Final Rule, again xvithout a new
round of notice and comnent, and again with an invitation to
submit public comments. Finally, DOT issued, vithout additional notice and comment, the Fourth Final Rule, xw hich is the
object of this challenge.
In the months following 9/11, DOT learned that cargo
carriers xvere not harmed financially in the same xxvay as passencontinued onlnext page
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ger carriers.To the contrary, the demand for military shipments
and the reduction in cargo space on passenger flights combined
to improve the finances of some cargo carriers. As a result, in
the Third Final Rule DOT introduced the "offset" concept,
under which statutory compensation for the period when
flights were halted would be offset by the extent to which later
earnings exceeded previous forecasts.The rule included various
presumptions that would govern resolution of offset disputes.
The air cargo industry challenged the rule on three grounds.
First, they argued that the offset violated the statute. Second,
they challenged the presumptions and other implementation
procedures.Third, they argued that the Third and Fourth Final
Rules were invalid because DOT had failed to provide for
notice and comment. DOT prevailed on all points.
The statutory ruling is unusual in that the court upheld the
agency's Chevr'ii Step 2 position despite the agency's failure to
provide a valid explanation of its interpretation.According to
the D.C. Circuit, the agency's explanation was flawed because it
effectively rendered some statutory language superfluous.The
court nonetheless upheld the agency's position because the
court itself was able to articulate an acceptable justification,
seemingly a violation of the principles of SEC v. Clicnei,,332

U.S. 194 (1947).
The court justified its action by noting that"DOT has
already chosen between competing meanings and made its
policy choice."Thus, the case was distinct from one in which
the agency had believed its interpretation had been compelled
by the statute. In the latter situation, there must be a remand for

the agency to make the policy choice. In this circumstance,
however,"No principle of administrative law or common sense
requires us to remand a case in quest of a perfect opinion unless
there is reason to believe that the remand might lead to a different result."Thus, it appears that a court may substitute its own
reasoning to uphold a Chevron Step 2 policy choice.The court
does not explain how this situation differs from one in which a
court perceives an alternative explanation that would allow a
rule to survive arbitrary and capricious review. In such a case,
the court must remand for the agency itself to articulate a
rational basis for its action (or adopt an explanation suggested
by the court).
As to the presumptions and other procedures, the court held
they were not ripe for review because they might not result in
any loss to the carriers.The court did, however, warn DOT
against unduly limiting the evidence that could be presented in
an effort to overcome the presumptions.
Finally, the court rejected the procedural challenge to the
Third and Fourth Final Rules. Noting that, "perhaps DOT
should not have labeled the First through Third rules as "final,"
the court said that the agency had made a "compelling
shx ing" that it has provided the necessaiy opportunity to
comment before the Fourth Final Rule. Indeed, there had ultimately been three opportunities to comment during the
development of the rule.The mere fact that the agency had
labeled the third rule as "Final" did not preclude the agency
fiom seeking additional comment and making the revisions
that became the Fourth Final Rule. Since the agency had
sought comments with an open mind, it had satisfied the
requirements of the APA. C>
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Due Process Clause rather than the Takings Clause; (2) the
statute should have been evaluated under the deferential
"rational basis" test rather than the "reasonable relationship"
test; and (3) the Hawaii District Court gave too little deference
to the state government's findings regarding the relationship
between rent regulation and the legitimate state interests that it
sought to promote. In its petition for certiorari,the State of
Hawaii framed two issues for the Supreme Court:
(1) Whether the Just Compensation Clause authorizes a
court to invalidate state economic legislation on its face
and enjoin enforcement of the law on the basis that the
legislation does not substantially advance a legitimate
state interest, without regard to whether the challenged
law diminishes the economic value or usefulness of
any property.
Admiinistrative and RcytilatorT Lau, Ncvs
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(2) Whether a court, in determining under the Just
Compensation Clause wNhether state economic legislation substantially advances a legitimate state interest,
should apply a deferential standard of review equivalent
to that traditionally applied to economic legislation
under the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses, or
may instead substitute its judgment for that of the legislature by determining de novo, by a preponderance of
the evidence at trial, whether the legislation will be
effective in achieving its goals.
Petition forWrit of Certiorari, 2004WL 1745842, at *1
(July 30, 2004). So framed, therefore, Lingle invites the
Court not only to discuss the relationship between substantive due process and Fifth Amendment takings but also to
expound on the federalism-related respect that federal
courts owe to state legislatures. C)
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The High Stakes in Primary Jurisdiction
By MichaelAsimow
The "primary jurisdiction" rule applies to cases that fall within
the original jurisdiction of a court but which must be transferred by the court to an administrative agency with specialized
expertise in the subject matter of the case.A particularly
complex application of primary jurisdiction occurs when the
referral to the agency concerns only some of the issues in a
case.When that happens the agency resolves the issues transferred to it, then refers the case back to the court to handle the
remaining issues. The rationale for primary jurisdiction is
compelling, but the cost can be enormous delay and mushrooming legal fees.
In Jonathan \eil &Associates v.Jones, 16 Cal.Rptr. 3d 849 (CA
Supreme Ct. 2004), the underlying dispute concerned vhether
an insurance company had overbilled a small trucking company
for retroactive premiums.The S5 1,000 bill drove the trucker
out ofbusiness. It sued for breach of the implied covenant of
good faith in the insurance contract, a claim wxhich carries the
potential for very large damages.
The insurer claimed that the case should have been transferred to the Insurance Commissioner because it involved
highly technical questions of insurance lawx. (The trucker was
part of the assigned risk pool and the dispute concerned the
appropriate premiums on the trucker's use of subcontractors).
The trial court refiused to transfer the case and there followed a
months-long trial consisting of a training course for the jury on
assigned risk underwriting.The jury returned a verdict for
about S13.5 million which the trial court reduced to about
S6.2 million (rather large amounts for a dispute over a
S51,000 premium).
The Supreme Court decided that the trial court should have
transferred the insurance part of the dispute to the Insurance
Commissioner for adjudication under the assigned risk procedures. In the event that the Commissioner determines that the
insurer overbilled the trucker, the case would return to court
for consideration of damages (the Supreme Court also determined that punitive damages could not be awarded in a dispute
over the amount of insurance premiums).
This decision seems correct since the Neal case presents a
paradigm example of the application of the doctrine of primary
jurisdiction.Yet it illustrates the unbelievable complexity of the
actual operation of primary jurisdiction, particularly where a
months-long trial has already occurred.The whole dispute
concerned a S5 1,000 premium, yet the attorneys' fees must
already be in the millions of dollars and the litigation wxill not
*Professor of Law Emeritus, UCLA Law School; Council Member;
Advisory Board Chair; and Contributing Editor.
I Professor of La, Widener University School of Law.
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be concluded for many years (presumably the trucker wx'ill run
out of gas and settle the case soon). Perhaps this is a case in
which some short-cut could have been used instead of a fullfledged transfer. For example, the court might have asked the
Insurance Commissioner to file an amicus brief in the court
case rather than to suspend the court case for a full referral to
the Commissioner followed by a retransfer to the court.

Judicial Review of Pennsylvania Veteran's
Preference: Looking for Law inAll the Wrong Places
ByJohn L. Gedid1
In Alerrell r ChartiersValley School District,855 A.2d 713 (Pa.
2()04), claimant applied for a position as a social studies teacher
with the school district.After reaching the fourth step of a five
step hiring process, he was eliminated from the hiring process
by letter. He argued that he should have received the position
because of a preference to w-hich he -,vas entitled under the
Pennsylvania veteran's preference statute.The school district
argued that the letter -,vas an 'adjudication," and, since claimant
exceeded the 30-day appeal filing deadline by several months,
his action was barred.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court explained that the threshold
issue was whether the letter -vas an "adjudication."The Pennsylvania definition of adjudication is similar to the contested case
definition of the 1961 Model State Administrative Procedure Act:
any final determination or ruling by an agenc- that affects
"personal or property rights, privileges, immunities, duties, liabilities or obligations of any or all of the parties."
In defining "adjudication" for purposes of the timing provision, the Court looked in the wrong place. It used the familiar
Roth analysis to determine that an applicant for a teaching position, who seeks to rely on a discretionarx and ill-defined
veteran's preference, has not been deprived of'"property."
Hence, the letter xxvas not an "adjudication:'As a result, the
applicant -was not bound by the 30-day provision, and, hence,
his appeal was timely.
However, the Roth analy sis should be used only to determine
whether a party has a right to a due process hearing at the
agency level.There are a vast number of'adjudications"
rendered by government agencies in cases in wdhich due process
doesn't apply. Consequentl. it appears to be a mismatch to
excuse an applicant from the statute of limitations on seeking
judicial review of an agency decision just because the applicant
had no due process right to a hearing at the agency level.
Instead, the term "adjudication" in the judicial review statute
should apply to any final agency ruling in a case that determines
an individual's legal position.A letter denying him a teaching position despite the veteran's preference certainly qualifies as an
"adjudication" and the 30-day judicial reviewx statute should
have been applicable.The Pennsylvania courts have not adopted
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that approach. Instead, a stream of cases has applied the Roth
analysis to determine if there was an adjudication for purposes
of determining if there is a right to review, or, as in this case,
when the clock begins to run for appeal purposes.
There is yet another problem with the court's approach in
this case. If the applicant reached the fourth step in the application process, it would appear that he was qualified, but the
school district believed that another candidate was more qualified. If the legislature's intent as expressed in the veteran's
preference statute is to have any meaning-it is after all the role
of the courts to give effect to that meaning or policy-then a
qualified veteran applicant should be treated as having some
sort of property right in the job.The court's approach in Merrell
appears to strip a qualified veteran applicant of any tangible
benefit from the preference statute.

A New Standard for Notice and
Public Comment in Georgia
2
By Lois F Oakley

In deciding a challenge to the issuance of a pollutant discharge
permit, the Georgia Supreme Court has issued an opinion with
a significant discussion of the role of public participation in an
agency's issuance of permits.Agency actions that require public
notice and comment may be subjected to renewed public
notice and comment in certain circumstances.When an agency
makes significant changes to a proposed permit following
public comment, the agency is required to engage in renewed
public notice and comment. Citing precedent from the D.C.
Circuit Court ofAppeals, Georgia's highest court explained
that an agency's adoption of "acompletely different approach"
after public notice and comment subjects the amended permit
to a renewed comment requirement.A process devoid of this
renewed opportunity for comment would impermissibly
preclude the public from "a meaningful opportunity to participate in the comment process." Hughey v.Gwinttt County, 20()4
Ga. LEXIS 1045 (November 23,2004), citing Natural Resource
Dqfense Council, hIc. v.EPA, 859 E2d 156, 175 (D.C. Cir. 1988).

Due Process Unleashed: Ohio Law Goes to the Dogs
3
By William S.Jordan

Relying on a faulty premise, the Supreme Court of Ohio
recently invited a wave of due process litigation against animal
wardens, police, and others who warn members of the public that
they are violating the law. In State i,Cot'an, 103 Ohio St.3d 144.
2Chief State Administrative LawJudge, Georgia Office of State Adniinistrative Hearings.
3 C. Blake McDowell Professor of Law, The University of Akron
School of Law;Vice ChairJudicial Review Committee; and
Contributing Editor.
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814 N.E.2d 846 (2004), the defendant's neighbors complained to
a dog warden, who warned the defendant that her dogs were
"vicious dogs" under the applicable statute. He explained that an
owner of vicious dogs must comply with certain statutory
requirements. Sometime later, the deputy found the dogs to be in
conditions that did not comply with the statute. Again, he advised
the owner of her responsibilities.The third time, the deputy filed
charges for violation of the vicious dog statute.At trial, the jury
convicted the dog owner on all charges.
On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed the convictions,
holding that the vicious dog statute was unconstitutional because a
dog owner has no right to be heard prior to a warden's determination that her dogs are vicious.According to the majority, it is
"inherently unfair that a dog owner must defy the statutory regulations and become a criminal defendant, thereby risking going to
jail and losing her property, in order to challenge a dog warden's
unilateral decision to classify her property.' 'The Court also held
that even if the statute were constitutional, due process was denied
on the particular facts because the deputy warden in this case had
effectively made an administrative determination that the dogs
were vicious.As the Court read the transcript, this determination
was bindhig on the jury,such that the dog owner never had a right
to be heard on the question of whether her dogs were vicious.
ChiefJustice Moyer's dissent demolishes the majority's reasoning.As to the facial constitutionality of the statute, he points out
that the statute itself defines the category ofvicious dogs and
directly imposes obligations on the owners of such dogs.The
warden's role is solely to enforce the existing obligation. Although
the warden may express an opinion as to whether the dogs are
vicious, that opinion does not constitute a legally significant
administrative determination.As to the particular facts, the dissent
concludes that the dog owner "had a fial opportunity at trial to
contest charges that she owned vicious dogs."
The majority's opinion threatens severe rigidity in law enforcement. Interpreted in light of the statutory provisions, it creates a
strong incentive for law enforcement personnel to proceed
directly to arrest, without providing warnings or seeking to
educate apparent offenders about the requirements of the applicable statutes.The only apparent escape from this dilemma is to
interpret the decision as applying only to circumstances in which
legal obligations are triggered by an administrative determination,
in which case due process should applyThis interpretation is
consistent with the language and logic of the opinion, but inconsistent with the underlying statute or facts.

Fee Shifting: California Goes Its Own Way-Again
By MichaelAsimow
California adinistrative law often differs sharply from federal
law and a prime example is the question of attorney fee shifting.
Under federal law,each party pays its own fees except where
continued on page 32
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4. Dan M. Kahan,

LOGIC OF RECIPROCITY:TRusT, COLLEC-

TIVE ACTION, AND LAW,

1. Ronald M. Levin, Forthcoming, THE ADMsIIsTRATIvE
LAW LEGACY OF KENNETH CULP DAVIS, 42 San Diego L.
Rev. - (2005).
An analysis of and homage to the late Professor Kenneth Culp
Davis' intellectual contributions to Administrative Law.
2. Steven L. Schooner, CONTRACTOR ATROCrrIES AT ABU
GHRAiB: CoMPRoNsED AccouNTAmrY IN A STREAMLINED, OuTsouRcED GovERNmENT, Forthcoming, 16 Stan.

L. & Pol'y Rev.

- (2005).

A critique of current government "outsourcing" practices, highlighted by the Abu Ghraib Prison scandal.The author argues the
government's vastly increased reliance on private contractors for
government work has created serious administrative and managerial problems in government contracting, including, 1) grossly
insufficient personnel and resources for adequate contract oversight, 2) reliance upon previously discouraged "personal services
contracts" which place private, often poorly trained, workers
next to government employees vithout supervisory training,
3) awarding of umbrella group contracts for "work to be named
later", reducing head to head contractor competition for specific
projects, and 4) agency "farming out" of contract procurement
to other agencies whose primary contract stake is generated
fees, not work qualit: The author advocates a return to government contracting fundamentals - competition, oversight,
transparency and reviewx.
3. Daniel Halberstarn, OF POWER AND

RESPONSBILITY

TIrE POLITICAL MORALITY OF FEDERAL SYSTEMS, 90 Va.

L. Rev. 731 (2004).
A comparative law analysis of European (Germany and the
European Union) and American federalism structures.Author
contrasts the "entitlement" approach ofAmerican federalism
doctrine (each unit - federal government or states, have allocated authority wx
hich they are entitled to exercise as a matter
of right), with the "fidelity " approach of European federalism in
wx
hich each entity owes "fidelty" to the proper finctioning of
the system as a whole, and thus has judicially enforceable moral
obligations to exercise its authority to promote the wx
elt-being
of the entire federal system.
1Associate Professor of Law.The John Marshall Law School, Chicago,
IL;Vice-Chair, Constitutional Law and Separation of Poxvers Committee; and Contributing Editor. These abstracts are drawn primarily from
the authors' introductions to their articles.To avoid duplication. the
abstracts do not include articles from the Administrative Lawx Review
which Administrative Law Section Members already receive.
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102 Mich. L. Rev. 71 (2003).

This article disputes the traditional theory of collective action,
rooted in Mancur Olson's "Logic of Collective Action," which
posits that individuals in groups xwill under-contribute to the
group if they can get away with "free riding" on others' efforts.
Kahan argues this "free rider" theory of group behaviour is
undercut by intervening empirical research.This research shows
that people in groups are more "emotionally nuanced"altruistically cooperating when they think others are, but shirking when they perceive others not reciprocating. He argues this
"logic of reciprocity" suggests an alternative program for avoiding collective action problems by using lav to promote trust.

5. Robert W. Hahn, THE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
LATION:A RESPONSE TO THE CRITICS,

OF REGu-

71 U. Chi. L. Rev.

1021 (2004).
Robert Hahn summarizes and responds to criticisms of regulatory scorecards and other quantitative regulatory analysis
methods. He concludes 1) quantitative measures have improved
understanding of the regulatory process, 2) some critics' suggestions are legitimate, others are not, 3) refinements to scorecards
would address many criticisms, 4) scorecards should be
improved, not abandoned.

6. Eric A. Posner and Cass R. Sunstein, DOLLARS AND
U. of Chi. L. Rev. - (200-).

DEATH, Forthcoming

Analytical comparison of ho-- regulatory law and tort lawx
assign dollar values to life.The authors argue that both
approaches are flawx ed but can learn from each other.

7. Michael Abramowicz,

INFORMATION MARKETS,
ADMINISTRATIVE DECISIONMAKING, AND PREDICTIVE
COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS, 71 U. Chi. L. Rev. 933 (2004).

Article addresses whether information markets, such as the
FutureMap program, proposed by the Defense Advanced
Research Projects Agencx. (DARPA), can improve the quality of
agency predictions.These markets are created to aggregate
predictive information about future facts. He concludes information markets can improve agency predictions, but only if
designed to overcome problems, such as potential manipulation.
One benefit is these markets' objectivit. which decrease might
reduce interest group manipulation of bureaucrats, and the like.

8. Richard J. Pierce, Jr.,

REALIZING THE PROMISE OF
RESTRUCTURING THE ELECTRICITY MARKET, Forthcoming,

Wake Forest L. Rev.

_

(2005).

The author, an early advocate of deregulation of electricity
markets, does an in-depth post-mortem review of the several
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12. Bruce P.Frohnen, LAW'S

continuedfrom previous page

CULTURE: CONSERVATISM

AND THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER,

decade-old electricity deregulation project, describing successes
(the Ilid-Atlantic region), failures (California), and the lessons
learned.The author discusses anticipated and unanticipated
economic, legal and political obstacles to full realization of
deregulation's benefits. Convinced the project is essential, the
author offers suggestions for future success.

9.Thomas 0. McGarity, MTBE: A

27 Harv.

J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 459 (2004).
An intellectual history ofAmerican conservatism, discussing,
among other things, its origins and roots, differences between
conservativism and neoconservatism, and conservatism's relationship to American constitutional and political thought.The
article stresses conservatism's grounding in historical and traditional culture as a source of norms.

PRECAUTIONARY

TALE, 28 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 281 (2004).
This article describes how MTBE, a widely used gasoline leadreplacement additive which severely contaminates
groundwater, became the poster child for regulatory failure.
The author discusses federal environmental regulation's impact
on the crisis, including five crisis-avoidance decisions EPA or
Congress could have made, but didn't.After discussing how
well eight analytical models of regulatory failure explain the
MBTE crisis, the author advocates a precautionary regulatory
approach, including 1) a broader "multi-media view," 2)
broader participation by affected interests, and 3) less deference
to regulated interests' narrow economic concerns.
10. Catherine T. Struve, THE FDA AND

THE TORT

SYSTEM: POST-MARKETING SURVEILLANCE, COMPENSA-

Forthcoming,
Yale J. of Health Pol'y, L. & Ethics
(Summer 2005).

TION, AND THE ROLE OF LITIGATION,

The author argues for a joint FDA/private litigation system to
protect medical product safety.To avoid potential Seventh
Amendment problems, the author proposes a "novel process"
in which a federal court would refer product safety and causation issues to an FDA advisory panel, subject to final review by
the FDA.These findings would be conclusive. Most damages
would finance a compensation fund for persons harmed by
the product.
11.Jim Rossi, DUAL CONSTITUTIONS AND CONSTITUTIONAL DUELS: SEPARATION OF POWERS AND STATE
IMPLEMENTATION OF FEDERALLY-INSPIRED REGULATORY
PROGRAMS AND STANDARDS, Forthcoming,

Wm. &

Mary L. Rev. __
This Article examines the problem of federal/state conflicts in
state implementation of federal regulatory programs, particularly conflicts with state constitutions.The author argues that
broad federal preemption is not the only solution. Better interpretation of state constitutions can resolve these problems.
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13. POINT-COUNTERPOINT: PREEMPTION (PARTS I & 11):
23 Ann. Rev. Banking & Fin. L. 225, et seq. (2004).
These two articles debate the legality of recent (January 2004)
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) rules which
preempt almost all state regulation of national banks. Arthur E.

Wilmarth,Jr,The OCC's Preemption Rules Exceed The
Agency's Authority and Present A Serious Threat to
The Dual Banking System and Consumer Protection
(PartI, p. 225):, Howard N Cayne, Nancy L. Perkins,PointCounterpoint: National Bank Act Preemption: The
OCC's New Rules Do Not Pose a Threat to Consumer
Protection or The Dual Banking System (PartII, p.365).

Empirical Studies
1. Kiki Caruson and J. Michael Bitzer, AT THE CROSSROADS OF POLICYMAKING: EXECUTIVE POLITICS,
ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION, AND JUDICIAL DEFERENCE BY
THE DC CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS (1985-1996),
26 L. & Pol'y 347 (2004).
An empirical study ofjudicial deference to adninistrative agencies in the DC Circuit from 1985-1996.Authors found the
standard of review was not a statistically significant factor in
predicting the level of deference. Instead,judges deferred more to
agency decisions that aligned with the judges' policy preferences.
2. Kristi M. Smith, WHO'S SUING WHOM?: A COMPARISON OF GOVERNMENT AND CITIZEN SUIT
ENVIRONMENTAL ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS BROUGHT
UNDER EPA-ADmINISTRED STATUTES, 1995-2000,29

Colum.J. Envtl. L. 359 (2004).
This article compares environmental enforcement actions initiated by citizens with those initiated by government.The author
found some changes from a major 1980 ELI study. Large environmental organizations no longer dominate the citizen suit
arena, citizens bring approximately one third of their actions
against public defendants, and both citizen and government
enforcement actions seem to have benefited from the use of an
expanded range of remedies.The authors advocate more
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research to filly understand the effects of citizen enforcement
on federal environmental regulation.

Recent Symposia of Interest:
1. The Constitution In Times Of Emergency, 113 Yale L.J.
1751, et. seq, (2004). (Symposia Articles are Responses to
Bruce Ackerman, The Emergency Constitution,113Yale L.J.

1029 (2004).)
Note, p. 1751, ii)
Includes Articles By: i) John Manning, EditorX'
David Cole, The Priority of lorality:The Emergency Constitution

Blind Spot, p. 1753, iii) Laurence H.Tribe, Patrick 0. Gudridge,
Essay, TheAnti-Emergency Constitution,p. 1801, and iv) Bruce
p. 1871.
Ackerman, Response, This Is\otA I ar;,

2. The Changing Laws of War: Do We Need a New Legal
Regime after September 11?, 79 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1183,
et. seq, (2004).
Includes Articles By: i) JohnYoo, TransferringTerrorists,p. 1183, ii)
Michael
Neal Katval, SunsettingJudicial Opinions,p. 1237, iii)
Stokes Paulsen, The Constitution of N'ecessity,p. 1257, iv)Saikrishna Prakash, The ConstitutionAs Suicide Pact, p. 1299, v) Patrick
Baude, An Essay on the Spirit of LDberty in the Fog qf I ar,p. 1321,
vi) Jordan J. Paust, Post-9/11 Overreaction and Fallacies Regarding
T ar and Defense, Guantanamo,the Status of Persons,Treatment,Judiaal Review of Detention, and Due Process in Ailitary Commissions,

p. 1335, vi) William C. Bradford, 'The Duty to Defend Thein':A
Natural LawJustificationfor the Bush Doctrine ofPreentiv I Ibr.
p. 1365, vii) DerekJinks, Protective Parity and the Laws oflWar, p.
1493, and viii) Michael D. Ramse\. Reinventing the Security
Council:The U. as a Lockean System, p. 1529.

3. We've Only Just Begun:The Impact of Remand Orders from
Higher to Lower Courts onAmerican Jurisprudence, 36 Ariz.
St. L.J. 493, et. seq, (2004),
IncludesArticles By: i) MichaelA. Berch, JIb've OnlyJust Begun:
The Impact Of Remand Orders From HighierTo Lowver Courts On
AmericanJurisprudence,PreliminaryRemarks, p. 493. ii) Ervin
Chemerinsky and Ned Miltenberg. The \'eed To Clari) 7ie
Mleaning Of US. Supreme Court Remands:The L'ssons Of Punitive
Damages' Cases, p. 513,iii) Tracy Friddle andJon M. Sands,
All Right": Remands, FederalSentencing
"Don'tThink 7ivice, It'
Guidelines & The Protect Act-A Radical "Departure"?,p. 527. iv)
Shaun P.Martin, GainingThe G I 'R, p. 551, v) Daniel B.
Rodriguez, Of Gift Horses and GreatExpectations: Remands
ff'ithout Vacatur in Administrative Lau,,p. 599, and xi) John Cary
Sims, ComplianceI I ithout Remands:The Experience Under The
European Convention On Human Rights, p. 639.
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4. ScienceforJudges I: The Practice of Epidemiology and
AdministrativeAgency Created Science, 12 J. L. & Pol'y 485,
et. seq, (2004).
4 5
Includes Articles By: i) Margaret A. Berger, Introduction, p. 8 , ii)
John Concato, M.D., Overview Of Research Design In Epidemiol-

ogy, p. 489, iii) John PA. Joannidis, M.D. &Joseph Lau, M.D.,
509
, iv) James Robins.
Systematic Review Of.\ledical Evidence, p.
Should Compensation Schemes Be Based on the Probability of Causation or ExpectedYears of i fe Lost?, p. 537, v) Richard Merrill,
4
FDA Regulatory RequirementsAs Tort Standards,p. 5 9, vi)
Michael A. Friedman, M. D., I hat Is The Value OfAn FDA
Approval In AJudicial Matter?,p. 559, vii) Robert M. Sussman,
Science and EPA Decision-Lking,p. 573, viii) Wendy E.Wagner,
Importing Daubert to AdministrativeAgencies Through The Informa-

tion QualityAct. p. 589, and Lx) Sheila Jasanoff and Dogan Perese,
Welfare State OrWelfare Court:Asbestos Litigation In
Comparative Perspective, p. 619.
5. Up the Ladder and Beyond:The New Professional Standards
for Lawyers Under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 49Vill. L. Rev.
725, et. seq,, (2004).
Includes Articles By: i) Roger C. Cramton, George M. Cohen
and Susan P. Koniak, LegalAnd Ethical Duties QfLauyers After

Sarbanes-Oxley,p. 72 5 , ii) M. Peter Moser and Stanley Keller,
Sarbanes-Oxley 307:Trusted Counselors Or Informers?,p. 833, iii)
Michael A. Perino, SEC Enforcement OfAttorney Up- The-Ladder
Reporting Rules:An Analysis Of Institutional Constraints,\ornis
And Biases, p. 851, and ix) Mark A. Sargent, Lauyers In The .Aloral

Maze, p. 867.
6. The Digital Broadband Migration:Toward a Regulatory
Regime for the InternetAge, 3 J.Telecomm. & High Tech.
L. 5, et. seq, (2004).
Includes Articles By: i) Michael K. Povell, Preserving Internet
Freedom: Guiding PrinciplesForThe Industry, p. 5, ii) Christopher
S.Yoo, TI buld Mandating BroadbandNetwork Nutrality Help Or
23
Hurt Competition?A Comment On The End-To-End Debate,p. .
iii) TimWu. The Broadband Debate,A Llcr Guide, p. 69, iv)
Howard A. Shelanski, Competition Polic, ForMobile Broadband
NeVtorks, p. 97. v) J. Scott Marcus, Evolving Core Capabilitiesof
the Internet,p. 121, vi) Peter P. Svire, A Model ForII hen Disclosure
Helps Security: II liat Ls Different About Compute And N'etuork

Security?, p. 163.
7. Meeting Human Needs: Examining The Social Safety Net For
WorkingAmerica, 44 Santa Clara L. Rev. 961, et. seq, (2004).
Includes Articles By: i) Stephanie M.Wildman, Foreword,p. 961,
ii) John A. Powell, The Nceds Ot-Membetr Ii A Legitimate Democcontinued on next page
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ratic State, p. 969, iii) Frank Munger, Beyond Welfare Reform: Can
We Build A Local Welfare State?, p. 999, iv) Dorothy E. Roberts,
Welfare Reform And Economic Freedom:Low-Income Mothers'DccisionsAbout WorkAt HomeAnd In The Market,p. 1029, v) Jean
jhe Social Safety Net:
Braucher, Consumer BankruptcyAs Part Of
Fresh Start Or Treadmill?,p. 1065, vi) Karen Syma Czapanskiy,
Unemployment Insurance Reform ForMom, p. 1093, vii) David L.
Gregory, 19th Century Local Unemployment Compensation Insuranice Law In The 21st Century Global Economy, p. 1113, viii)
Deborah Maranville, Unemployment him nce Meets Globalization
And The Modern I1brktircc, p. 1129, and ix) William P Quigley,
Prison I vork, Wages,And CatholicSocial Thought:Justice Demands
Decent I brk ForDecent I ags,Even For Prisoners,p. 1159.
8. The Environment, the Public Health, and the Next Generation of Protection, 30 Am.J. L. & Med. 115, et. seq, (2004),
Includes Articles By: i) Carol Browner, Foreword:Environmental
Policy:PrinciplesForThe Next Generation Qf Protection,p. 115, ii)
WendyWagner and David Michaels, Equal Treatment ForRegulatory Science: Extending The Contwols, Governing The Quality Of
Pblilic Research To Private Research,p. 119, iii) Jay D.Wexler, Parks
As Gyms? Recreational ParadignisAnd Public Health In The
NationalParks, p. 155, iv) RichardW Clapp and David Ozonoff,
EnvironnentAnd Health:Vital Intersection Or Contested Territory?,

p. 189, v) Victoria Sutton, EnvironmentAnd Public Health InA
Time Of Plague,p. 21 7 , vi) Gale Norton and Michael Suk,
America s Public LandsAnd Waters:The Gateway To Better Health?,
p. 237, vii) Pamela D. Harvey and C. Mark Smith, The Mercurys
Falling:TheMassachusettsApproach To Reducing Mercury In The
Environment,p. 2 4 5, viii) Sumudu Atapattu, The PublicHealth
Impact Of Global Environmental ProblemsAnd The Role OfInternational Law, PastAnd Present,p. 283, ix) Devra Lee Davis and
Carrie Forrester, Environmental Health Challenges In Southwestern
Pennsylvania:Some Comments On The Right To A Clean Environment, p. 305, and x) Robert R. Kuehn, Suppression Of
Environmental Science, p. 33 3 .
9. TransnationalismAsA Social Movement Strategy: Institutions,Actors And International Labor Standards, 10 U.C.
Davis J. Int'l L. & Pol'y 1, et. seq, (2003).
Includes Articles By: i) Ruben J. Garcia, Introduction,p. 1, ii)
Sandra Polaski, ProtectingLabor Rights Through TradeAgreements:
An Analytical Guide, p. 13, iii) Katie Quan, Strategies For Garment
Worker Empowerment In The Global Economy, p. 27, iv) Stephen F
Diamond, The "Race To The Bottom"Returns: China's Challenge
To The InternationalLabor Movement, p. 39, v) Frank Emmert,
Labor,Em'iromnnoital StandardsAnd World Trade Law,p. 75, vi) Ivy
C. Lee and Mie Lewis, Human Trafficking FromA LegalAdvocates
Perspective:History,Legal FrameworkAnd CurrentAnti-Trafficking
Efforts, p. 169. C)

vvvvgaase"s

S~r

AN ESSENTIAL RESOURCE TO KEEP YOU CURRENT
ON THIS EVER-CHANGING PROCESS
from the ABA Section of Administrative Law and Regulatory Practice
Guide to Medicare Coverage Decision-Making andAppeals is a step-by-step walk through
the intricacies of this ever-changing and often controversial process.The book provides
you with an introduction and thorough overview of the latest law and policy on
Medicare coverage decision-making issues including coverage of new medical treatments, technologies and devices.Written by national experts on Medicare, the book
includes targeted analyses of the decision-making and appeals processes from the unique
perspectives of.
"
"

Medicare beneficiaries
Providers

0 Centers for Medicare and
Medicaid Services

E Manufacturers
Regular price $69.95.
Discount available for members.
Source code:ARLNWI03
Product code: 5010033
#22002, 6 x 9,220 pages, paperback

Adininismtrti1'c and Reynlatory Liu, Nc

To give you an added advantage in understanding current Medicare decision-making
procedures, the book includes citations to related cases and other materials.
An appendix contains relevant sections of the Medicare, Medicaid and SCHIP
Benefits Improvement and Protection Act of 2000 (BIPA), and the current HCFA
FederalRegister notice outlining the procedures for making national coverage decisions.
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Bulletin from Homeland Security Committee and
Defense and National Security Committee
By Lynne Zusman1

I

ntelligence Reform. Congress passed the historic re-structure of Intelligence frnction during its last week in session
to establish a DNI (Director of National Intelligence), i.e.,
a supra- Intelligence Czar in the USA, for the first time, to
bang the heads of the highly competitive existing components of the current government bureaucracy.The legislation
also created a national counter-terrorism center, which is
theoretically going to be more effective than the numerous
counter-terrorism centers in operation at a myriad of important agencies already.
DHS General Counsel. General Counsel, the Honorable Joe
D.WhAtley of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
on December 6 delivered a riveting speech on the operations
and outlook of the DHS at anAdlaw Section lunch program.A
highlight of Mr.Whitley's speech was the observation that rulemaking and regulatory processes of the agencies are the lifeline
of the government's ability to implement Congress' intentions
accurately, effectively, and promptly.
UN Role inWar on Terror.Various messes at the United
Nations have distracted onlookers from scrutinizing what, if
any role, the UN plays in the War on Terror. Conceptually, one
would have thought that this International Organization would
lead the fight. After all, is not the Security Council conceptually
the Mother of all World Security Movements. Not so, as
described by Nicholas Rostow, on December 14 at a breakfast
program of the ABA Standing Committee on Lawx and
National Security, a sister operation in the ABA. Rostow,
General Counsel of the U.S. Mission to the United Nations
and Senior Policy Adviser to the U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations since Oct. 3, 201, told the
gathering that "norm development" has been the preoccupation historically of this body over the last several decades;
although some progress is apparent in that the next configuration of the Security Council xillfor the first time NOT include
a country universally recognized as harboring terrorists.Additionally,Mr. Rostow noted, neither the EU, the IMF, nor the
World Bank recognized themselves as having any finction,
role, or responsibility, in the global fight against terror, until
recent dialogues on the issue. Finally, Mr. Rostov noted that
historically the United Nations has approached terrorism as a
social disease rather than the political instrument that it is.
I Chair, Homeland Security Committee; Co-chair, Defense and
National Security Committee; Section Liaison to the Standing
Comnittee on Law%and National Security; Section Representative to
ABA Homeland Security Task Force; Former Council Member.
2 "Murders on U.S. soil" is the characterization of the author, not the
speaker.
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And indeed, it is one of the most effective political instruments in history.According to the speaker, one interpretation
of the "shelf life" of the 9/11 murders on U.S. soil2 is the two
month period immediately following 9/11 when debates were
conducted on whether 9/11 was terrorist activity or not, by
UN definition.

Former Section ChairBill Funk inducts L S. Court of Federal ClaimsJudge
Susan G. Braden as new Section Fellow. Also inducted but not shown here:
new Section Fellow andformer Section ChairNeil R. Eisner; new Senior
Fellows: D. C. CircuitJudge Merrick B. Garland;and Victor G. Rosenblum,
NathanielL. Nathanson Professor of Law Emeritus at Northwestern LUninersity School of Law

Interstate Compact APA Project
roject co-chairs Bill Morrow andJeffrey Li-vak
provided an update on the now one-year-old State
Administrative Law Committee project to develop an
APA for application to agencies created by interstate
compact. Morrow & Litwak explained that the need for such
an APA was driven by the general inapplicability of the
federal APA and state APAs to such agencies.
Litwak mentioned that the previous days panel on compact
agency adjudication had produced a number of fine papers on
the topic and was marked by an engaging discussion on that
and related topics involving audience members as well as the
panelists themselves.
Morrow and Litwak also noted that the upcoming midyear
meeting in Salt Lake City wonuld feature a panel on compact
agency rulemaking and that the spring meeting would feature
a panel on judicial review of compact agency action.

continued on next page
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Morrow and Litwak also announced they had been
appointed to the Advisory Group of the National Center for
Interstate Compacts.

Nominating Committee
ormer Section Chair Neil Eisner delivered the Nominating Committee report. The committee is seeking
nominations for vice chair. Traditionally, this would be
filled with someone from outside D.C. this year. The
committee is seeking nominations for four council positions,
as well. Finally, the committee is seeking nominations for
assistant secretary and assistant budget officer.

9/11 Taskforce

R

on
Smith,that
co-chair
of the Section's
9/11 Taskforce,
reported
the taskforce
met September
30,2004,
the
committee would
how
on
and reached a consensus
proceed in the future. The taskforce members agreed in
substantial part to: (1) monitor legislative developments and
report relevant developments to Section Chair Randy May
and the Section Council; (2) meet again if there are any such
developments; (3) monitor proposed regulations implementing legislation resulting from the 9/11 Commission Report;
(4) seek the Council's approval to refer any such proposed
regulations to the appropriate Section committee; and (5) be
prepared to consider any proposals made by other organizations or ABA entities and make recommendations to the
Council with respect to those proposals. C)

News from the States
continuedfrom page 26
provided by statute. 4 But California case law5 and the statute
that codified it 6 permit a "successful party" to recover attorney's
fees from its opponent if the action resulted in the "enforcement
of an important right affecting the public interest:'
In Buckhannon, 7 the U. S. Supreme Court rejected the "catalyst theory," meaning that the plaintiff must obtain relief
through a judgment or consent decree, not through a settlement catalyzed by the lawsuit. In Graham v.DaimlerChrysler
Corp.,8 California resoundingly rejected Buckhannon, allowing a
plaintiff whose lawsuit was a catalyst for settlement to recover
its reasonable attorney's fees under the public interest statute.
The Graham decision pointed out the perverse effects of Buckhamon: it encourages defendants to litigate fiercely and,just
before losing the case, settle it in order to avoid fee liability. By
the same token, Buckhannon encourages plaintiffs to refiuse to
settle a case just to keep its claim for attorney's fees alive.
The Graham case imposed some new restrictions on catalyst
cases: to award fees, the court must determine that the underly4 Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v.Wilderness Society, 421 U.S. 240
(1975).
5 Serrano v. Priest, 141 CaL.Rptr. 315 (1977).
6 Code of Civil Procedure §1021.5.
7 Buckhannon Board & Care Home, Inc. v.WestVirginia Dep't of
Health and Human Resources, 532 U.S. 598 (2001) (the decision
was 4-3).
82004WL 2739179.
9The same day, the Court imposed an additional restriction in the case
of governmental defendants: the plaintiff cannot recover if the effect of
a settlement was merely to accelerate the issuance of a regulation or
other government remedial measure that was already ongoing when
the litigation was filed.Tipton-Whittingham v. City of Los Angeles,

2004WL 2743389.

ing lawsuit had merit and that settlement was not compelled by
a mere nuisance suit or threat of expenses.This determination
may require a mini-trial if the settlement comes early in the
lawsuit before the facts have been developed. In addition, the
plaintiff must establish that it sought to settle the matter short
of litigation. 9
Parties can recover the costs incurred in recovering attorney's
fees-so-called fee-on-fee litigation. Sometimes the fees
incurred in obtaining fees can exceed the fees incurred in the
underlying lawsuit. Here the Court imposed a new restriction.
Unlike federal courts, 10 California routinely increases the

lodestar (reasonable hours times reasonable hourly rate) in the
underlying litigation for such factors as the contingent nature

of the fee and the plaintiff's skill. However, enhancement of the
lodestar should apply to a much lesser degree in determining

reasonable fees for fighting about fees (as opposed to reasonable
fees incurred in the underlying litigation).
Under the actual facts of Graham, the plaintiff's claim for
public interest attorney's fees was extraordinarily weak.The
lawsuit was for breach of warranty on the sale of a Dakota truck
which hauled only 2,000 pounds instead of the promised
6,400. By the time plaintiff brought its class action, Chrysler
had already set up a remedial scheme for buyers and the California Attorney General and a local District Attorney had
threatened legal action-The case was settled not long after
plaintiff filed and before plaintiff had done any significant work
on his case. Under the new restrictions on catalyst recoveries
adopted in Graham, the plaintiff may well be barred from
recovering fees because he brought a nuisance suit or because
he failed to attempt settlement before filing his lawsuit. C)

10 Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552 (1988).
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